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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

IRAQI-SYRIAN UNITY SEEN IN CONTEXT OF IRANIAN THREAT

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 23 Jun 79 pp 19-20

[Text] The bilateral summit meeting in Baghdad between Syrian President Hafez Al Assad and Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr produced the expected results: a re-affirmation of the will to unify the two countries and the creation of a unified political command, which replaces but does not bolster, the joint higher political committee which was also formed of the two chiefs of state.

What the summit, and the final declaration of June 19, clearly demonstrated, however, was that the unification of the two states would precede the unification of the two Baath parties. Although this conclusion does not give a clear indication of the speed with which the unification process will be carried out, it demonstrated, beyond doubt, that it was Syria who, in the final analysis, had the last say on the question.

Before the summit was held, Iraqi official statements and press reports underlined the need for unifying the party and even said that the unification of the Baath Party would be the condition sine qua non to the unification of the two states' institutions and structures.

However, the final document, dubbed the "Baghdad declaration" dwelt very little on the question of party re-unification. It only includes three or four lines that say that a Party committee will be formed to lay down the necessary principles, studies and documents required for the unification of the Party that would be carried out simultaneously with the constitutional unification of the two states. The committee is to be headed by Interior Minister Izzat Ibrahim for Iraq, and Mohammed Haidar for Syria, and not by more prominent members of the parties.

Furthermore, in declarations he made to reporters during the summit, Syrian President Assad never mentioned the word "party" while Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein often insisted on that point. Mr Saddam Hussein made a very significant declaration to the press just after President Assad's departure, saying that the unification of the two states had "outrun" that of the parties and that it was necessary to make up for the delays.

In other terms, contrary to expectations based on the fact that Iraq was seen as having a strong edge over Syria, it was Syria which, in the final analysis, brought Iraq around to its own way of thinking.

The main reason for this reversal of the situation is seen in the development that occurred prior to the summit, and mainly in Iraq's involvement in the Khuzistan problems in Iran, and in Iran's picking on Iraq.

The race has begun between Iraq and Iran on who will be the side in charge of the region's security after the downfall of the Shah's Iran but Iraq has its own views and conditions on the matter and has already taken action against Communists, in Iraq first and elsewhere in the Arab world and has accused Iran of still being the "beagle" of imperialism in the region. But Iran's new regime has not relinquished the former role that the country played in the region and benefits here from the fact that the U.S. has invested so much in that country that it is not totally unwilling to do away with it, especially in view of the fact that Iraq is posing conditions and does not aim to be a mere instrument.

Iran and the Iraqi-Iranian dispute served as the background to the talks between the Syrian and Iraqi leaders; the latter being aware that Syria does not have the same attitude towards Iran and maintains sound relations with the new Iranian leadership. Shortly before the summit convened, reports spoke of a possible Syrian mediation between Iraq and Iran and there was even talk that President Assad could personally go directly from Baghdad to Tehran for this purpose.

Many observers see it that the Iranian threat to Iraq is becoming more and more acute every day because Shia contestation in Iraq is becoming more and more serious, especially in the South of the country and among the followers of Imam Bakr Sadre who lives under house arrest in the Najaf. Rumours have begun to circulate concerning demonstrations and incidents.

Thus it would appear that it was the Iranian threat which drove Iraq to adopt a more lenient stand concerning Syria's views of unity between the two countries, especially because of the role that Syria could play in the Iraqi-Iranian dispute.

For this reason, the summit meeting did not come out with more than an assertion that the two sides were still engaged although the wedding may take a long time to be held. It constituted an attempt at normalization and coordination, more than unification, and almost equalized the force and influence of the two sides.

Whether unification moves will be driven further now hinges on many factors, the main ones being whether the U.S. launches a new diplomatic initiative aimed at having more Arab sides join the peace process, and whether the Soviet Union will respond to the demands that Syrian President Assad will make when he visits Moscow later on.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL DISCUSSES INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 7 Jul 79 p 29

[Interview with Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi in Tunis, by Yasir 'Abd-rabbuh]

[Text] [Question] AL-MUSTAQBAL is pleased to be the first magazine in the world to predict your election as secretary general of the Arab League 2 months before, and....

The new secretary general of the Arab League interrupted me to say: When the late President Boumediene died, I recall that I was at our embassy in Paris. There were all kinds of speculations about the successor and we were making some ourselves when our ambassador there said that AL-MUSTAQBAL is predicting that Chadli Bendjedid will win the presidency. But I categorically dismissed this only to be surprised by the fact that your predictions were 100 percent right. And now this is the second time you were right.

At this point, As'ad al-As'ad, the assistant secretary general, who was present during the interview, broke in to say: That's why your name is AL-MUSTAQBAL [Arabic for "future"]. We laughed, and I turned to the secretary general again:

[Question] You have a host of problems which have to be cleared up before you can devote your efforts to the Arabs' number one question--the Palestine question. The first problem to solve is that of the disputes among various Arab governments. What kind of solutions do you propose to offer to settle these disputes?

[Answer] I thank God that a major rapprochement has taken place between two eastern Arab states before my election and that they are now embarking on unionist arrangements. I am referring to Syria and Iraq. I don't think that there are basic differences among the states in the Arab east. There remains, however, a painful dispute between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara, and I hope to God that it will end shortly. I

will do my best on that score. The main characteristic of the Arab nation is that the relations among peoples are always above the disputes among the regimes and governments. At every conference and in every capital we see the sons of the Arab nation coexisting amicably and fraternally although their states may be at odds with each other. This confirms the greatness of this nation.

[Question] What are the steps you intend to take after your election?

[Answer] First of all, I will pay a visit to all the Arab capitals and I will meet with their majesties and excellencies the kings and heads of states with most of whom I have a personal friendship. I will listen to their points of view and then draw up an action plan.

[Question] Will there be an action plan on Lebanon?

[Answer] The events that took and are taking place in Lebanon make the heart of every Arab bleed. I will give the Lebanese problem a lot of my time and effort, and I hope to be able to bring all the parties together in order to solve the tragedy of our brethren in Lebanon. I hope to be successful in doing that with the support and help of the Lebanese and Arab leaders. No doubt the extension of the Arab Deterrence Forces (ADF) for 6 more months which was voted here at the recent Arab foreign ministers meeting in Tunis will provide me with an opportunity to act.

[Question] On the day of your unanimous election as secretary general of the Arab League the Egyptian media said that the election was illegal. How could you respond to that?

[Answer] Twenty-one Arab states have elected me unanimously, and sisterly Egypt was the only state which failed to attend the meetings. I do not intend to get into a slinging match with the Egyptian media, but I hope that Egypt will return to the fold of the Arab family. Incidentally, I am against vituperations. At any rate, I cannot but hope to God that Egypt would return to the correct Arab path.

[Question] Do you believe that the next phase necessitates another Arab summit?

[Answer] Arab summits are held once a year, I believe. It must be said, however, that Arab summits are not a magic ring. We should prepare well for them to be successful.

[Question] Do you plan to seek Egypt's return to the Arab family?

[Answer] Two things set us apart from the Egyptian regime: the first is that the phase-by-phase policy according to which the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations took place under the sponsorship of the United States was not wisely selected because the question is not that of the restoration of

Sinai or the Golan Heights. And it is not true that the return of any of these areas represents a step toward a comprehensive solution. The second point is that the choice made by the Egyptian regime was not wise because it divided the Arab front which is the basis of Arab strength. With the collapse of this strength, what is there left for us? So the Egyptian solution is an individual one. What matters is not the numbers, as the Egyptian regime believes. That is to say that no Arab state, regardless of how big and populous it is, has the right to divide the Arabs. I say this with a sense of brotherhood and without rancor, and I hope that our brethren in Egypt will realize that they have committed a big mistake which will lead to catastrophe, especially that Israel, despite the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, is still demonstrating to the world that it is pursuing an expansionist policy and continuing to toy with the rights of the Palestinian people. It is true that we are not against negotiation, but negotiation should not be done at the expense of principles and substance. We hope that the Egyptians will soon correct themselves. To reform is a virtue. One should try out new ideas and approaches, but he should also recant and return to the right path if his attempts proved to be wrong and unsuccessful. In Egypt's case, the approach it tried out was disastrous.

[Question] Do you intend to call upon all the Palestinian groups to unify themselves?

[Answer] I feel proud when I say that all the struggling Palestinian forces are grouped under one organization which is capable of undertaking its historical responsibilities. On this occasion, I salute brother Yasir 'Arafat who shoulders these responsibilities, but I must admit that there are other Palestinian factions, which are no less steeped in struggle than the Palestine Liberation Organization's factions, whose patience has run out, thus impelling them to commit some emotional actions. This is a natural and understandable thing, for how can we ask a people that has been homeless for more than 30 years to adhere to logic and reason. I wish here to emphasize that I am against any tutelage on the Palestinian people and against giving them advice, because they are mature and can think for themselves and because they are fully aware of their interests.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

IAN-ARAB OIL POLICY ADVOCATED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 29 Jun 79 pp 36-37

[Article by Jalal Kishk: "Toward a Pan-Arab Oil Strategy"]

[Text] The leaders of the capitalist world are meeting in order to unite themselves for the confrontation with the OPEC countries, and in spite of this not one Arab meeting has been held nor has any conference on the Pan-Arab level taken place.

There were two meetings held this week, the first one in Geneva, and the second one in Tokyo. The first one included the petroleum ministers in 13 countries: Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Gabon. The second one included Jimmy Carter, Helmut Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, Margaret Thatcher, John Clark, Giulio Andreotti, and Masayoshi Ohira. Their occupations, (in the order of the names given, are: chiefs of state of the United States, West Germany, France, Britain, Canada, Italy, and Japan.

There is a connection between the two meetings. The chiefs of state of the seven countries which completely dominate the economy, finances, industry, and military activity of the non-communist world set the date of their meeting to be after the OPEC meeting in order to act according to what the 13 ministers decide on--ministers whose names are difficult to remember! That is why mention has been made only of their countries, which, even when taken all together, do not have the income of the American tobacco industry or the volume of sales of the Mitsubishi Corporation in Japan. And their total military capability is less than that of Canada or Italy. In spite of that, that is, the OPEC countries, somehow dominate the stability, welfare, and peace of the world! And I do not believe that, since the 1973 War, a more provocative caricature has appeared in the "free" world, and in the leader of the free world, the United States, than the caricature (shown below) published by the HERALD TRIBUNE on the eve of the two conferences.

This is the reality which the whole world knows and acts on the basis of, and which the OPEC countries have less realization of, and in their actions show less awareness of, than any other bloc of nations. Proof of this is that the

seven major nations are meeting to discuss the energy crisis and OPEC's position, and are doing so on the level of their chiefs of state, while the OPEC countries do not consider that the matter goes beyond the responsibilities of the petroleum ministers within the scope of the petroleum-exporting countries. Another proof is that, during the last 2 months, dozens of meetings have been held, and dozens of declarations and studies have been issued and published, by the governments and organizations of the industrial world, calling for a united front concerning the energy problem and the OPEC countries. There has even been enacted a number of laws, from California to Paris and Moscow, which regulate energy consumption. And there has not been a single meeting on the part of the OPEC countries, or to be more exact, the group of Arab countries whose concerns concern us and whose decisions affect our affairs! Except for an assurance by Dr Mani' al-'Utaybah that the oil-producing countries are capable of defending their oil, advice by Dr Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani that the industrial world should limit its consumption, and a declaration by Shaykh 'Ali al-Khalifah al-Sabah concerning what the newspaper AL-SIYASAH has called the "shock theory"--and the essence of this is that the industrial world must be dealt with by means of a "price shock," to be decided in a Geneva conference, which would make that world wake up out of its slumber!--except for these things the OPEC countries are still dealing with the oil problem according to the motto that the oil of Ecuador or 'Ajman concerns only the government of Ecuador or 'Ajman, just as is the case with the coffee beans of Brazil and the cacao of Ghana!

On the other hand, the leaders of the industrial world reject this logic and insist that the "oil situation" is threatening the stability of the whole world. The U. S. secretary of the treasury stated at a meeting of the OCED, or Organization of Cooperation and Development in the advanced countries (24 countries), that he considered it proper to restrict his speech, at the meeting, to a discussion about oil, since "oil is the most important problem that we are faced with, and if we do not succeed in solving this problem, any effort in any other field will be useless toward accomplishing stability, growth, and price stabilization, which is what we are striving toward." He touched upon the position of the OPEC countries, saying that the sale of petroleum at \$17 [a barrel] means an increase of 30 percent from what it was last December. And he said that the rise in price of petroleum to \$17 [a barrel] will raise the rate of inflation in America by 1 percent and will curtail its production by one-half of 1 percent, and that this means that the United States will be paying an additional 14 billion to the OPEC countries over and above what it is currently paying. He said that the value of its oil purchases will amount to \$60 billion next year, that the organization's 24 members will be paying 46 billion additional dollars, and that the developing countries will be burdened with paying an additional 7 billion [dollars], which they will find impossible to come up with except by sacrificing basic necessities. He added that the balance of payments of the industrial countries will be assuming a deficit amounting to \$20 billion next year, and that for the developing countries it will be 5 billion, and that America's deficit will

reach a figure of \$11 billion. The speech is clearly agitation against the OPEC countries, since it has never happened in history that a country with the military strength of the United States has allowed a country the size of Ecuador or Gabon to inflict such losses upon it merely by means of a decision made by its petroleum minister!

The International Energy Commission's final report clearly rejected the price shock remedy in light of what the U. S. secretary of the treasury said and according to the text of the report, which called for "solidarity in order to confront the energy crisis which is going from bad to worse as long as the prices of oil are not stabilized."

The Japanese spokesman, on behalf of the conference of the seven nations, the pillars of industrial wisdom, said: "The aim of the conference is to form an international body to regulate the prices of oil and to limit demand." And he added: "What worries the countries participating in the Tokyo Conference is the fear of a probable confrontation with the OPEC nations..." Whatever one might say about the modesty of the Japanese, which is in contrast to the style of the spokesman who talked about America's worry about confronting Gabon, is it not irritating that the OPEC countries have not expressed any worry about this confrontation, and that we, in the Arab world, the heart of OPEC, are absolutely unconcerned about this confrontation with the seven countries, and that we believe that the problem of "'Ali 'Id," Fum al-Shubbak, the fall of Khalid Muhi al-Din, and the formation of the government in the United Arab Emirates are more important?! The Japanese spokesman said: "The problem is the inability of the industrial nations to form a united front in order to deal with OPEC." He also said: "The solution is not to fight for oil, because a struggle of that sort benefits only the OPEC countries." This is the opinion arrived at by the "Atlantic Institute" which is an organization, with its headquarters in Paris, which is concerned with issues affecting the security of the Western nations. This month its board of directors' report demanded that the industrial nations adopt a collective stance in order to confront the energy threat, and advised that any bilateral solution will be detrimental to the whole group, and that a collective stance is a necessity.

The alarm was sounded not only in the capitalist world, which depends on OPEC oil. On the eve of the Geneva and Tokyo meetings, the Soviet Union decreed a new law, restricting the consumption of oil, which is of a severity unknown since the time of World War II. And however true might be the CIA's reports about the Soviet Union's hunger for oil, and the strong doubts surrounding its assessments, it is a fact that the Soviet Union needs a portion of the oil in the Middle East and the revenue from this oil, and that it is affected by international oil prices. Even though it possesses huge petroleum reserves, the development of these reserves will require \$24 billion during the 80's. There is no source currently available except for the dollars of the OPEC organization which, in the opinion of the Soviets, should oblige its member-nations to transfer a considerable portion of their profits to the Soviet treasury as a tribute imposed in return for its military power, and because

they are the reason for the rise in prices of the Western technology and American wheat which the Soviets buy with dollars.

In Tokyo, and previously in Paris, Rotterdam, and Moscow, there has been a clamor about the necessity of getting ready for next winter. In the OPEC countries nobody is asking about what will happen this winter. What makes all these black clouds hover over the advanced world? We tried to answer this question in the article entitled "The Gulf Burns in the Wintertime," but (Ulf Lantz), the executive director of the International Energy Commission, stated in London, on 20 June 1979, that "the fall of the shah began a series of political and economic repercussions which will create oil problems more dangerous than what happened in 1974," and added: "We know what needs to be done. And it is time for action instead of words!:"

It may have been only a coincidence, but it is certainly very unsettling that, during the week of OPEC's meeting, the WASHINGTON POST published its first report about the suit brought by the International "Mechanics'" Union before a U. S. Federal Court, against the OPEC countries, accusing them of maintaining a monopoly, this being a crime in the United States! When it was going on, the court case did not attract any attention, and in spite of the summons to the OPEC countries, they--rightly and wisely--did not dignify it with a reply. But the case has now risen to the surface, and the WASHINGTON POST report says that the American government will try to intervene in favor of the OPEC countries, but that it is in a perplexing situation since it is difficult to defend the actions of these countries. It quoted an official source as saying that President Carter cannot agree to an intervention of this sort "since you can imagine the feelings of an American citizen, who spends hours in gasoline lines, when he hears on his car radio that the Justice Department will intervene and defend OPEC." Nevertheless, and in order to impart a degree of significance to the subject, the newspaper said: "We can get an idea of the degree of seriousness with which the Administration views the case by knowing who the people were that participated in the meeting that was held yesterday (Tuesday) in the White House. They were, for example, the deputy secretary of state, Warren Christopher, the public prosecutor, (Michael Evan), and the chiefs of the Bureau of Legal Affairs in the Treasury Department and the White House." The report clearly stated--the intended information--that the federal government can confiscate OPEC deposits and investments in the United States when the case is decided, and that then the Arab world will be without capital!

So the situation is serious, and is very upsetting for us, even if all we knew about oil might be that it is put in the "little gas stove" or the lamps of the poor people. This is not because the rise in oil prices is exhausting the budgets of poor Arabs who happen to be the great majority in our Arab nation, which unfortunately has both an eternal message and means of corruption. And it is not because the rise in the rate of world-wide inflation and the decline in the value of the dollar are both affecting the economy of this

majority of people and plans for their advancement, since because of the rise in oil prices in 1974 all of the expectations for advancement in the Sudan, Egypt, and Morocco crumbled and disappeared, and Mauritania and Somalia went bankrupt, etc. It is because the industrial countries, both capitalist and communist, are striving toward a decisive confrontation with the OPEC nations, a confrontation which will utilize all available weapons in terms of economic, financial, political, secret measures. Perhaps the confrontation will result in military action, indirect or direct, which would concern the entire Arab nation and threaten it with great dangers on all levels and for many years in the future.

Before you get the wrong idea, we should assure you that this discussion does not at all have in mind a call for sharing the oil profits, because this wealth is the sacred property of the countries upon which God has bestowed the oil. And there is no non-oil-producing country that has called for this, other than asserting that their wealth was shared with these oil-producing countries in the days when they could not even get a drink of water!

This is true, but since the oil affects the whole world and affects all the Arabs, then there must be a unified Arab strategy. The strange thing is that the slogan "Arab oil belongs to the Arabs" and the cry for nationalization, in the 50's and 60's, were louder in Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, and Khartoum, although the issue of oil was a local one at that time, and the Arab world's center of gravity and power of decision was outside the oil-producing countries. When oil became the Arabs' most important trump-card, and the whole world began to call the Arabs to account for it, and to make plans either against the Arabs, for confronting them, or siding with them because of their oil, then Arab collaboration in an oil policy disappeared, and feelings intensified against any attempt to participate in the creation of a pan-Arab oil strategy. It is true that President Sadat justified his trip to Jerusalem, by means of a unilateral decision, by saying that he is not consulted about raising or lowering the price of oil. It is true that this excuse is "a word of truth with which falsehood is intended." But it is no longer in anybody's interest not to have pan-Arab collaboration in drawing up an oil strategy. We must have scientific, strategic, political, and informational institutes, on a pan-Arab scale, that include all the capabilities of the Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese, Moroccans, etc., in addition to the capabilities of the oil-producing countries, in order to prepare the studies which will guide and participate in the making of decisions relating to oil. Is it not strange that the Americans, Japanese, Germans, English, Italians, Canadians, and French are meeting to coordinate their efforts to confront their problem with Arab oil, while not a single Arab meeting was held, nor was any contact made with any non-oil-producing Arab nation before the OPEC meeting?

And until we become convinced of the need for a pan-Arab oil strategy, how will the OPEC countries be able to confront the industrial world?

They cannot lower production to the level which covers their actual needs and guarantees the future of their upcoming generation, because the industrial countries would not stand with their hands tied, with their plants not operating, with their citizens unemployed, and with their children freezing in the cold, and because the OPEC countries have no interest in jolting the stability of the world or dragging it into a war with them, regardless of justice, because international policy is not based on rights, but rather on interests and force which protects these interests.

And they cannot raise the price to a level which would lower demand, as they want to do and as advised to do by specialists in international economics, because the industrial nations would suffer a collapse of their economies. And, most importantly, they cannot do this because--from the OPEC point of view--raising the prices and increasing production would increase the effects of the oil curse of "Midas." Midas was a Greek leader who was afflicted with the curse of gold. Everything he touched turned into gold, until he died of hunger because all of his food and drink turned into gold!

The OPEC countries are drowning in a sea of dollars and do not know what to do with them. An Arab economic source has told AL-HAWADITH that a number of countries in Europe, during the last few months, have refused to accept oil capital and stopped the sale of municipal bonds which the Arabs own a large proportion of (in municipalities in France and Britain). Also companies there are refusing to sell shares, or even to accept loans. The Arabs are now at a loss as to what to do with their money. They do not know where to deposit or invest it. And the crisis will become more aggravated with the additional millions which will pour down on the OPEC countries with a new increase in prices and in production! And nobody wants to sell his only source of wealth for tons of paper or dollars of diminished value, which cannot be exchanged. The solution which has been suggested since the 60's is the investment of this excess of money in an Arab Marshall Plan for the development of the whole Arab world, for the benefit of all the Arabs and all their generations. But th's did not happen, and perhaps the Arabs with the oil are the ones least responsible for this failure. They had good intentions of investing their money in the Arab world during the 40's and 50's, until their assets were nationalized through socialism or were grabbed up through bankruptcies and the breaking open of the safes in Lebanon. Then there were political disturbances and procrastination in repaying the loans. Finally there appeared the middle class and middle-men who transferred the money to Europe and America.

In the 70's there was a suggestion to solve the dollar crisis by creating an Arab dinar, or an Arabian Gulf dinar, and it was said that it would be the strongest international currency because it would be backed by the world's petroleum reserves, which is more important than gold. The objection to the idea, at that time, was that a currency's strength is not only in what backing it has, but rather primarily in its market of circulation and the number of people who do their transactions with it. For example, the Swiss franc has the strongest backing in the world in terms of gold and foreign currencies,

but it is not an international currency like the pound sterling even in its darkest days, and the reason for this is the size of the British economy and the volume of the market that deals with the British pound. And consequently those who raised this objection said that the currency demanded is one which would circulate throughout the Arab world and be bought by non-Arabs in order to obtain the services and production of 100 million Arabs.

In any case there are no indications of a trend toward the establishment of either an Arab or an Arabian Gulf currency. On the contrary, things are moving in the opposite direction. In the 40's the Gulf area used either the Saudi riyal or the Indian rupee, Egypt, the Sudan, and Palestine used the Egyptian pound, and Syria and Lebanon used the lira. In the 50's, along with independence, the prominence of the pan-Arab movement, and the realization of the slogan of unity (!), Egypt began to have its currency, the Sudan had its own pound, Syria had its lira, and Lebanon had its own lira. In the 60's Qatar and Dubai began to use the Qatari rupee, and the Emirates and Bahrain began to use the Bahraini dinar. Then the Qatari riyal, the Bahraini dinar, and the Emirates' dirham split off in the 70's, and there was an agreement to unify the exchange rate of the three currencies as a symbol, however humble, of unity. This came to an end last month, when Bahrain and the Emirates abolished their uniform exchange rate with the riyal, after Qatar raised the price of its riyal vis-a-vis the dollar.

Until the leaders of the seven nations, who have gotten together in Tokyo, decide something which is to go into effect, the question remains: What is the solution? How do we turn oil into a blessing instead of having it turn into a misfortune? How do we avoid the oil curse of Midas?!

The answer is that nobody knows. But this is like in a famous story, when a skeptic challenged a lawyer-theologian who believed in the Koranic verse "And what have we neglected to mention in the Book?" The skeptic said: "Then tell me how many loaves of bread there are in a kilogram of flour." The theologian made a telephone call to a bakery and then gave the answer to the skeptic, who thereupon said: "But you asked the baker, you didn't get the answer from the Koran!" The theologian then said: "There is a verse in the Koran which says: 'If you do not know something, ask those that do know.'" The starting point, then, is to gather together people with knowledge and experience, on a nation-wide pan-Arab basis, and have them form an institute of petroleum studies, the basic premise being that even if the petroleum wealth does not belong to all the Arabs, its problems still affect all Arabs, and for this reason it is imperative that there be a pan-Arab strategy. But who knows, perhaps the need for this institute is already well known, but the barrier in its way is a lack of fluidity!

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

REPORT OF ALLEGED LIBYAN-MAURITANIAN AGREEMENT ON SAHARA

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 79 p 34-35

[Article by Roland Malet: "The Wind of the Storm; From the Nervousness in Rabat to the Hesitations in Nouakchott"]

[Text] From now on, the Maghreb might flare up at any time: King Hassan II has just imprudently sowed the wind of the storm. One day or another, under the pretext that the Sahrawi fighters, possibly to escape the blows of the royal army, might try to seek refuge on Algerian soil, the Moroccan soldiers will not stop at the border but will pursue them beyond. They have received the formal order to that effect from the Sharifian sovereign. Rabat made this decision public on 6 June last.

It would very obviously be a violation of the Algerian territory. Nobody expects for an instant that Algeria would not react. Undoubtedly, the Algerian leaders as well as their military staff have long since set up a response plan; because the threat is not a new one. But it had never been quite this pressing. The king issued instructions so that the right of pursuit will be "effectively" exercised.

This initiative takes place within a diplomatic context which is not very favorable to the position taken by Morocco with regard to the matter of the Western Sahara, departing from the following thesis: the Polisario fighters are nothing more than Algerians in disguise. This is an interpretation which even countries which at first were favorable to Rabat are having more and more trouble agreeing with.

Thus, two countries, one of them an Arab one, the other European, believe that Polisario exists, because their leaders have met with them: on 6 June, the very day that the Moroccans announced their intention to exercise their "right of pursuit," King Hussein of Jordan, on an official visit to Algiers, met with a delegation of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR], led by the president of the Council of Ministers, Mr Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed.

Likewise, 5 weeks earlier, it was the president of the Spanish government, Mr Adolfo Suarez who, on 30 April, also in Algiers, talked with the secretary general of the Polisario Front, Mr Abdelaziz.

As a matter of fact, for several weeks now heads of state and of government have followed each other in Algiers. Along with these visits, the position of the Polisario Front is getting stronger. Thus, on 14 May, after a stay of 24 hours the president of Niger, Lieutenant Colonel Seymi Kountche, spoke out in favor of "the self-determination and the independence of the Sahrawi people, in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations and the OAU."

However, the Sahrawis received a sizeable support from Colonel Mu'ammarr Qadhafi. Not in the name of the Polisario but on its behalf, Tripoli negotiated a protocol of agreement with Nouakchott, which makes provision for the transfer to Polisario of that part of the Western Sahara controlled by Mauritania. Another meeting was to take place on 26 May, again in the Libyan capital, to settle the practical details of this agreement. The Mauritaniens were not at the rendezvous at the appointed date and the accidental death of the prime minister, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Ould Bousseif, was to provide a relevant pretext for this mishap.

In reality, the Mauritanian authorities have challenged the "particular, absolutely erroneous interpretation" of this document. But, it does exist. DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE, with exclusive access, is publishing its terms (see below): the interpretation of Tripoli and of the Polisario is confirmed.

A problem arises: if Nouakchott commits itself and then balks and denies, is there not a risk that its capacity for making decisions in an autonomous manner will very soon be doubted?

From 23 to 25 Djoumad el-Oula 1388 after the death of the Prophet, which corresponds to the period of 21 to 23 April 1979, a meeting took place between a Libyan delegation led by brother 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, secretary for foreign affairs of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and a Mauritanian delegation led by brother Ahmed Ould Abdallah, minister of foreign affairs and of cooperation of the Islamic Arab Republic of Mauritania.

During this meeting, the two parties examined the whole of the existing relations between the two sister countries and the means to strengthen them even further; they also conducted an exchange of views on questions which arise on the Arab and African level as well as on the international one.

The two parties specifically examined the following questions:

I. Bilateral Relations

The two parties reviewed the areas of cooperation between the two countries and the phases of execution of the projects which were set up with one accord; to this effect, the Mauritanian party expressed the desire to see the following projects become reality:

1. Participation in the iron mine project of Kallaba; participation in the agricultural project of Kalkal; participation in the general budget of Mauritania; participation in the project of the road linking Nouakchott with Naama; the deposit of funds with the Central Bank of Mauritania.

The Libyan Arab party gave assurances concerning the implementation of these projects which have already been the object of an agreement in the past.

2. The two parties agreed to a meeting, at the end of the month of June 1979 in Nouakchott, of the mixed committee which will be presided on the side of the Jamahiriya by the secretary for foreign affairs, and on the Mauritanian side by the minister of foreign affairs and of cooperation.

II. Question of the Sahara

The two parties examined this question in detail; the Mauritanian party reaffirmed the position of his country as expressed earlier and relative to the recognition by Mauritania of the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination, and its availability to enter into negotiations with the Polisario Front in Tripoli.

An agreement was reached on the following:

1. Mauritania agreed to return to the Polisario Front, the part of the Sahara which it has annexed.

2. Mauritania recognized the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and stated that its position on this subject has not changed.

3. Mauritania expressed its desire to establish good relations with Algeria, with the concern of establishing balanced relationships with Morocco and with Algeria; Mauritania has not entered into an agreement with Morocco against Algeria and will not enter into an agreement with Algeria against Morocco either.

4. The two parties agreed to the opening of negotiations in Tripoli, on 26 May 1979, between Mauritania and the Polisario Front to the end of signing a peace treaty, guaranteeing the establishment of a permanent peace between them and the handing over, by Mauritania to the Polisario Front, of the Sahrawi part under its control.

5. During the meeting, which will take place on 26 May 1979 between Mauritania and the Polisario Front, the means to allow for the implementation of the dispositions of paragraph four (4) will be examined.

6. The two parties announced their desire to continue the discussions and to strengthen their relationships in the interest of the two brother peoples and of the Arab and African causes. Within this framework, the two parties reaffirmed their opposition to any alliance of this nature.

III. In the Arab World

The two parties reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of the decisions of the meeting of Arab ministers of foreign affairs and of economy, which was held at Baghdad from 27 to 31 March 1979.

IV. Exchange of Visits

1. The brother secretary for foreign affairs of the Jamahiriya conveyed to the brother minister of foreign affairs of Mauritania, an invitation addressed to the brother prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to visit the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya as soon as possible.

2. The brother minister of foreign affairs and of cooperation of Mauritania addressed to the brother secretary for foreign affairs an invitation to visit the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. The invitation was accepted with pleasure.

Done in Tripoli, dated 25 Djoumad el-Oula 1388 after the death of the Prophet, corresponding to 23 April 1979.

Ahmed Ould Abdallah, minister of foreign affairs and of cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

Doctor 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, secretary for foreign affairs of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

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ALGERIA

RELEASE OF BEN BELLA CALLED SERVICE TO ARAB DEMOCRACY

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 15 Jul 79 p 1

[Article by Clovis Maqsud: "The Legitimacy of Opposition and Dignity of Loyalism"]

[Text] The release of former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella signals the first stirrings of a revival of Arab democracy. Ben Bella's name is associated with one of the most magnificent legacies of struggle and his regime distinguished itself by its affirmation of Algeria's Arab character after years of colonialist attempts to divorce Algeria from its heritage and destiny. Because Ben Bella's name has struck roots in our conscience, our generation agonized over giving the sound policies of the late President Houari Boumediene the support they deserved.

The decision to release Algeria's first president has now eliminated this anomaly and erased from our memory that sense of ambivalence and contradiction that never faded away. The nicest thing about this gesture is that we feel that a whole generation has been rehabilitated and vindicated. The sense of elation produced by the 1956 Suez battles, the [Egyptian-Syrian] unity in 1958 and Algeria's independence in 1962 is still alive in the memories of peoples. Indeed, the joy that swept the Arab masses at the news of the release of one of their symbols of struggle provides irrefutable proof that the decline in Arab unity is the exception and cannot develop into a fixed pattern in Arab life.

The most impressive thing about the decision taken by President Chadli Bendjedid is the impetus it gave to the future of Arab democracy. It is significant that an Arab regime has declared that it can coexist with its rivals and opponents. And even if Ahmed Ben Bella has no intention of being anyone of these, he remains after all a political symbol capable of polarizing the masses and organizing a movement.

The question, however, is not that of what Ben Bella intends to do but of what the Algerian regime has done. A regime is as democratic as the extent to which it enables the people to participate in the power structure. A regime does not have to have unanimous or 99 percent support.

What the Algerian Government has done was a service to a repressed democracy in the Arab world. It demonstrates the regime's self-confidence, while the absence of freedoms stands as evidence of a regime's worry over its fate and amounts to self-incrimination.

The release of Ahmed Ben Bella re-invokes in our memory a golden age of pan-Arab struggle and revives our expectations of an age of democratic participation. In an age where fundamental rights have become hopes and aspirations, we cannot but tell Algeria: thank you.

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ALGERIA

FLN LEADER SPELLS OUT ALGERIA'S REGIONAL, INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 7 Jul 79 pp 37-39

[Interview with Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, Coordinator of Algeria's National Liberation Front--FLN, by Nabil Darwish: "Yahiaoui to AL-MUSTAQBAL: Algeria Not a Party to the Sahara Dispute"]

[Text] Algiers--The man smiles and even laughs occasionally. This was the first surprise that met me as I entered the office of Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, member of the Political Bureau and coordinator of the FLN--that is to say the second man in Algeria's political leadership--at the party headquarters in the (Zouirat Yusuf) palace (which housed the National Assembly before the revolution). In the interval between the words of welcome and the beginning of the interview, I was wondering to myself about the reason why Mr Yahiaoui's face was smileless and serious in the hundreds of formal pictures which I saw of him days before the interview. The laugh with which Mr Yahiaoui bade me farewell at the entrance to his office after the interview reinvoked that subject in my mind, and it brought back to my mind a story I heard from Dr Muhyi al-Din 'Aminur, the press counselor of the president's office, during one of my several trips to Algeria. On one of his periodic visits to the Algerian countryside, the late President Houari Boumediene struck a conversation with an old peasant. The president was in a cheerful mood and was laughing heartily with the peasant. That evening the late president heard himself laughing on the radio. He immediately called in his press counselor, Dr 'Aminur, and mildly reproved him for allowing the laugh to go on the air. But Dr 'Aminur defended himself on grounds that the people like to know their president as a man, a human being. The president said nothing, either because he found his counselor's words convincing or because of his love for the counselor. Or maybe because Algerian press photographers cannot assume responsibilities as Dr 'Aminur does and so they avoid pressing the buttons of their cameras when leaders are smiling and laughing, hence the serious, unsmiling pictures.

Algerian officials in particular and the Algerian people in general have an excessive sense of decorum and correct behavior for reasons that may be historic, dating back to their days of struggle when a fighter had to be serious through and through.

The second surprise came as we sat down to begin the interview. It turned out that Mr Yahiaoui does not like microphones or recording machines and prefers to have the questions in writing and to answer them in writing as well. As I sat there quite surprised, Mr Yahiaoui exchanged smiles with 'Abd al-Majid and Salih, the chiefs of his information office, then he turned to me and reassured me that I can ask him any number of questions in addition to the written questions.

The interview went on for an hour and a half during which I gained insight into Mr Yahiaoui's life at various stages. When he speaks about the history of Algeria you clearly see on his face the enthusiasm of that struggling man who joined the revolution in the Aures Mountains in 1956. And when he talks about the party his personality takes on the character of the school teacher who taught school before joining the revolution, and you find yourself before a theoretician with a mind for organization that does not forget the smallest details. You even almost forget the military man in him who reached the highest rank--colonel. All you have to do, however, is look into his eyes to find yourself before a man who is used to giving orders. The touch of shyness which a journalist finds in senior officials who are still not used to making statements to the press is not to be seen on this man's face.

The FLN coordinator spoke in impeccable and faultless Arabic paying rather excessive attention to grammar. One recalls that it was Colonel Yahiaoui who ordered that Arabic be used in the Cherchell Military Academy which he commanded in 1969 and for the next 8 years before he took over the duties of the official in charge of the party apparatus in 1977 when President Boumediene began thinking of paving the way for the establishment of a party that would pull the state together and provide it with its own safety valves.

You begin by talking about the party, the party's position, the party and the state and the struggle which had reportedly taken place between them during the fourth party congress. But Mr Yahiaoui chooses to begin his talk by citing the speech made by President Chadli Bendjedid, the FLN secretary, in Al-Aghwat on the occasion of the 19th June anniversary. In that speech, the president talked about the steps which were taken within the framework of party reorganization, and said: "The party will witness greater activity in the next stage and its doors will be opened to all those strugglers who had not had the opportunity of joining its ranks." He also said that "the leadership of the state and its institutions should be drawn from the members of the FLN."

After that Mr Yahiaoui turned to the priorities in Algeria's history. Algeria's historical situation, he said, imposed on us the need "to give priority to the question of state building." The revolution did not present social platforms because the FLN waged a massive battle to get its independence first. Even the other Arabs thought that it would be impossible for the Algerians to become independent of the "French empire."

He also said: We not only sustained one and a half million martyrs; many people do not know that Algeria lost two-thirds of its population between 1830, the beginning of French colonialism, and 1870. When colonialism began, Algeria's population stood at 9 million people. In 1870, according to French historian Michel (Abar), Algeria's population was only 3 million people.

Mr Yahiaoui went on: Because of that situation and the need to wage a national battle, the social question was submerged. When the revolution broke out in 1954, Algeria was a mosaic tableau, in the sense that those who made the revolution came from all walks of life and represented various social affiliations. They all merged within the FLN. Two years after the outbreak of the revolution, we began to talk about "popular democracy." But this term which is now used in the Third World is rather loose. For us political independence alone is not enough. It is not a matter of raising a flag or singing the national anthem. But independence provided the common denominator among the social forces in Algeria. It was then joined by democracy in its broad sense then by social democracy.

At the 1962 Tripoli conference which preceded independence, we again raised the slogan of popular democracy. This is where Algeria took the name of the People's Democratic Algerian Republic. Independence brought with it 6,000 destroyed villages, hundreds of thousands of orphans and widows and the loss of one and a half million Algerians killed in the war. "Popular democracy" had to acquire an Algerian substance, in the sense that the masses have to determine the country's fate with their own will and participation. This concept is deeply rooted in Algeria. Martyr 'Abd al-Qadir Al-Jaza'iri is not the only prince who was elected in a democratic popular referendum.

Why Socialism?

The FLN coordination then moved to a discussion of the socialist alternative. Algerian socialism, he said, is a means not an end. It does not involve a search for a black bed in a dark room but a search for an independent and free society. Socialism represents the shortest route before the Algerian society which had selected it through conviction and experience.

After this historical background, I returned to the question of the party and the state. Mr Yahiaoui answered me about the party and party life, but he failed to mention that the fourth party congress which was held after Boumediene's death was concerned with the question of succession. He talked at length, however, about an extraordinary conference which will be held a year from now at most to deal with the organizational units of the party and to "evaluate the party strugglers" in the administrative, economic, social and cultural sectors, because "we cannot evaluate people in their homes where they sleep" but through their work. In addition to this, the party cell is like a human cell--it is born and it grows then grows old and eventually gets rejuvenated. No, not everything is completed

and we have begun to think about the question of party structure--the basic units, the local and central units and so forth although they have been rejuvenated.

[Question] And what about the party's role in the state?

[Answer] Algeria is the state of councils and institutions. You will find this slogan and hear about it everywhere. "The councils and institutions are the real channels." There are many committees and councils, the institutions are disciplined and the linkage between them is solid. All ministers, with the exception of Planning Minister 'Abd al-Hamid Ibrahim, are members of the central committee. Decisions are made in the central committee, but the political bureau, which has 13 members and replaced the revolutionary council, is the one which has the final say on those decisions. Theoretically, the party is everywhere. In practice, however, the party has just begun to penetrate army ranks. The army has its own party apparatus and organization by way of the political commission. The army commands, including those of the guidance machinery in the army, are all drawn from the party leadership.

The Written Questions

I present now the questions which I submitted to Mr Yahiaoui in writing and his written answers to them:

[Question] The late President Houari Boumediene was making preparations to devote the party's fourth congress to the question of building the basic structures and the safety valves. Observers had expected the conference to be one with a social motto. Where does the FLN stand now?

[Answer] As you know, preparations for the FLN's fourth congress began more than a year before the death of the late President Houari Boumediene. That means that all the preparations were being made under his direct supervision. Attention in those preparations focused on translating the National Charter's reference to the leadership role of the FLN. For the new structure to be sound, it was necessary to begin by having the five mass organizations (the workers federation, the peasants federation, the youth federation, the women's federation and the strugglers federation) hold their own congresses. After that we held the party's fourth congress which produced the new political leadership in the country headed by Brother Chadli Bendjedid. As you have observed in your question, many anti-revolutionary circles expected--indeed, were certain--that the Algerian revolution would not be able to pass that tough test following the departure of the late leader Houari Boumediene. But those circles overlooked the real strategy of the Algerian revolution: to build a state that would not disappear with the disappearance of men or government. And so, thanks to the awareness of the strugglers and the people's adherence to the revolution's socialist alternative and their determination to continue the march, the FLN emerged from the fourth congress stronger and sturdier.

[Question] In Algeria, the party is always referred to as a vanguard party. What does that mean, and can we say that it is a mass-based party or that it is on the way to being a mass-based party in the sense that it accepts the membership of any citizen?

[Answer] The FLN is a vanguard, not a mass, party. That is to say that membership and the opportunity of struggle are available to all citizens who meet the standards specified in the revolution's ideological document, namely, the National Charter, which says that the FLN is a vanguard party embracing the informed, enlightened elements who aspire to the accomplishment of a common objective and dedicate themselves to a common effort whose ultimate goal is the victory of socialism.

[Question] Over the past 10 years, Algeria spent 80 billion Algerian dinars on industrialization which has taken dimensions that are unprecedented in the Third World. You have the largest gas liquification plant in the world--the (Arzio) plant--in addition to several heavy industries, such as the (Al-Hajjar) complex. But there are some difficulties. According to observers, factories are operating at a rate of 50 to 70 percent of their capacity. How are you going to deal with this problem?

[Answer] The nonattainment of full capacity by the factories is a circumstantial matter, because the production output of industry is interconnected, as you know. What one industry produces may be an intermediary product for another industry. The absorptive capacity of plants will undoubtedly increase as development efforts and economic activity expand. Once this happens, the productive capacity of the factories and plants will increase too. On the other hand, the productive capacity of industry as a whole depends on the absorptive capacity of the sectors which consume industrial products, such as the agricultural and services sectors.

Added to this that the multinational corporations, which do not like to see a developing country regain its natural resources and use them to promote its economy, played a significant role in that regard by imposing their own monopoly and setting down tough conditions in the field of transfer of technology and other fields of cooperation. This situation has often had a dampening impact on our productive capacity,

But Algeria, by its determination to naturalize technology and create the skills and manpower which are capable of absorbing and handling it, will break this monopoly. We are confident that our country will win out in this battle as it had done just recently in the battles of nationalizing the mines, banks, insurance companies and the factories as well as the battle of oil and gas.

[Question] The agricultural revolution and its accomplishments, such as the socialist villages, were one of the most important achievements of Algeria. Yet agriculture accounts for only 16 percent of the national income.

[Answer] Because of conditions imposed on it by [French] occupation, agriculture was oriented toward certain export sectors and served the objectives set by the colonialists. The least we can say about those objectives is that they conflict with the goals we had set in the development program. Since the application of the agricultural revolution, Algerian agriculture saw radical changes which no one can deny, regardless of his views on the successes and victories of the Algerian revolution. As to the low percentage of agricultural revenue in relation to the general national income, this is due to the priorities which had been set in the development policy. From the beginning, efforts were concentrated on the task of establishing a national industry which would be the main foundation of the national economy by way of its contribution to all other economic sectors, including the agricultural sector. Now that the first objective has been achieved, efforts are focused on developing and modernizing agriculture by introducing into it modern means of production, especially since many parts of the industrial sector can be said to be dedicated to the agricultural sector, such as the fertilizer industry and the industry of manufacturing tractors and various farming machinery. This in addition to intensive efforts in the field of developing the irrigation sector and land reclamation program and fighting soil erosion and desertification. We are certain that all those efforts which aim at injecting a new life in the countryside and which are undertaken as part of the agricultural revolution will have positive effects in terms of promoting agriculture and improving its returns quantitatively and qualitatively. Whatever the case may be, the agricultural revolution cannot be assessed merely by its percentage of the national income. Its basic aim is to renew the countryside, do away with the production relations that had dominated it and bring up its social and cultural standard. All this would, of course, directly affect the economy. I would like to make one observation here: In the speech of 1 May 1979, we said that if there have been mistakes, then yes to a review [of what we have done], no to retreat [from what we have done]. That is to say that we insist on keeping the country's potentialities in a state of constant development and growth in order to fulfill the needs of the citizens and the homeland. President Chadli Bendjedid spares no opportunity to emphasize this matter, especially the question of food.

No Summit With Morocco

[Question] The Western Sahara issue has recently been escalating in a manner that, according to Algerian and Moroccan officials, might lead to an explosion in the region. What about Algeria's position. Do you believe that a summit conference between Algeria and Morocco will produce a settlement or the first step toward a settlement or will at least create a suitable climate for a settlement?

[Answer] The Western Sahara question is one of the liberation questions in the world. It has not been contrived either by the strugglers in the Western Sahara or by Algeria, as the Rabat regime and others allege. It is the question of a people defending their freedom, land and

independence--a right endorsed by various international organizations. Algeria still believes that this problem must be solved peacefully, and it has not sought to create tension in the area at all. Algeria has not concealed its assistance to and support of the Saharan people which emanate from its policy of supporting all liberation movements in the world and from the principles of the United Nations as well. Not a single Algerian soldier has stepped beyond the borders of the homeland. At the same time Algeria will not tolerate any infringement of its own territory. Any aggression, regardless of its source, will entail serious consequences for peace and security in the region.

As you know, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is making efforts to solve this problem through its arbiter's committee. Algeria welcomes all efforts from anywhere if they are designed to enable the Saharan people to exercise self-determination. But the holding of an Algerian-Moroccan summit, as you suggest, has no justification, especially since Morocco rejects in principle the right of self-determination and does not recognize the resolutions and tenets of the United Nations and the OAU. Added to this that Algeria is not a party to the conflict. Algeria, however, encourages any initiative for a peaceful settlement based on justice.

[Question] Many developments have occurred in the Middle East question since the departure of President Boumediene who was actively and significantly involved in this question before his death. How do you see the situation and what will be the nature of Algerian action in the forthcoming phase?

[Answer] The situation in the Middle East took a dangerous turn since the Egyptian President's visit to Jerusalem and the alliance with Israel against the Arab nation and the Palestinian people. The decisive and urgent response to that step was the establishment of the steadfastness front then the convocation of the Baghdad conference. As the late President Houari Boumediene and President Chadli Bendjedid said on more than one occasion, Algeria believes that a solution cannot be attained until the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people have been recognized, including the establishment of an independent state and withdrawal from the Arab lands occupied in 1967. Algeria's stand, as you know, is a firm one. We are with the Palestinian people and we support peace based on justice and the fulfillment of the rights of peoples.

We and Libya in the Same Trench

[Question] There is a joint defense agreement between Algeria and Libya. Did Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi discuss with you on his latest visit the means of implementing the agreement should that become necessary in the future?

[Answer] Regardless of agreements signed between one state and another, the clear fact is that the Arab and African region is being subjected

now to a well-planned imperialist offensive. The Arab homeland in particular bears the brunt of this offensive more than any other area for reasons with which you are familiar. It is natural in the face of such an offensive that a progressive front of struggle be set up to confront the imperialist designs. In this context, the relations and common objectives and stands which exist between the Algerian revolution and the Libyan revolution place them in the same trench against any offensive. This in addition to the fact that the steadfastness front constitutes the Arab force that emerged to confront all the maneuvers and the offensive mounted by imperialism acting in alliance with reaction, whose main link is Al-Sadat's conspiracy against the Arab nation and the progressive forces.

[Question] The nonaligned summit is drawing closer at a time when there are some differences over principles or over appraisal of the nonaligned movement. The conference will discuss some important issues, such as membership of Egypt, Vietnam and Cambodia. There are in addition many criticisms of the host country, Cuba.

[Answer] Algeria is a nonaligned country--in fact, it is a founding member of the nonaligned movement. It is fully committed to the principles and goals of nonalignment and will continue its struggle along the same path to which it had committed itself. We will oppose anything that will alter the substance of that path or divert it from its course. We will not, however, be bothered with the particularities and small details which enemies of the nonaligned movement are trying to bring up in order to cause a split in the ranks. The essential struggle is one between nonalignment and the imperialist forces which are trying to crack the unity of that movement and ultimately to impose their influence over and increase their exploitation of the Third World.

[Question] Algerian-French relations have gone through several crises. One of the last wishes of the late President Boumediene was to clear the air with France. How do you characterize those relations now?

[Answer] Algeria's desire to cooperate equally and exchange interests with all states is a firm and consistent principle in our foreign policy. This is true of our relations with France. The two countries are linked by several historical factors and common issues which would redound to the benefit of the Algerian and French peoples if they were rid of preconceptions and prior judgments. We believe that the position taken by the late President Houari Boumediene, to which you refer, still represents our official position, as brother President Chadli Bendjedid reaffirmed in his cable to the president of France. We would like to purify the atmosphere in a manner which would guarantee the interests of both sides and bring respect for the rights and dignity of our expatriate community in France. This would make it possible to establish an honest cooperation between the two countries on the basis of justice, equality and the respect of each other's sovereignty and choices. On the other hand, we are prepared to work jointly toward the purpose of reestablishing calm, security and

stability in the region and making the Mediterranean region one of peace and civilizational exchange as well as an area of international relations that are based on cooperation under the principle of respecting the sovereignty and political, economic and cultural sovereignty of peoples.

[Question] You are accused of paving the way to strengthen the Soviet presence. What about your relations with Moscow and Washington?

[Answer] Algeria's jealousy over its independence and sovereignty is not something new. It has offered one-tenth of its population to achieve this sacred goal and it will never relinquish it. This total commitment was best exemplified in the National Charter which emphasized "the revolution's determination to be free of all foreign fetters and to determine its internal and external policies in accordance with the interests and ideals of our people which guide our international activities."

We believe that this is enough to refute the empty allegations propagated by certain quarters which are known for their traditional hostility to the Algerian revolution.

As to our relations with the Soviet Union, they are not the offspring of certain circumstances, but date back to the days of struggle against colonialism. They are developing nicely and naturally in a manner which guarantees the interests of the two countries on the basis of mutual respect and a joint endeavor to support the causes of peoples and fight all forms of domination, hegemony and exploitation. These are the principles which guide our foreign policy with all states.

The fixed principle in our foreign policy is to cooperate with all states which desire to cooperate with us on the basis of mutual respect, equal interests and noninterference in the internal affairs of others. Nothing absolutely bars us from cooperating with the United States on the basis of those principles. This, however, does not prevent us from fighting imperialism and all kinds of domination, subservience and neocolonialism, or supporting liberation movements and the just causes of peoples and confronting the imperialist front with all the necessary and proper tools and means.

9254

CSO: 4402

MOROCCAN THREATS OF HOT PURSUIT DENOUNCED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8-9 Jun 79 p 1

[Editorial by Lies Hamdani: "The Enemies of the Liberty of the Peoples"]

[Text] King Hassan II of Morocco has just given instructions for the right of hot pursuit to be exercised by Morocco's Royal Armed Forces vis-a-vis Algeria. In other words the Moroccan sovereign ordered his troops to violate Algeria's territorial integrity and to extend to the Algerian people the war of aggression that he has been waging since 1976 against the fraternal people of Western Sahara.

The official communiques of the Moroccan Ministry of Information, the content of the messages on this subject addressed to the incumbent president of the Organization of African Unity, the convocation of ambassadors of the member-states of the Security Council accredited to Rabat, and all the reports broadcast and commented on by the international news agencies reflect the resolve of the king of Morocco to move from the stage of threats to that of action, that is, of military aggression against Algeria, its territory, and its people.

This decision of King Hassan II now poses a serious threat to the Algerian and Moroccan peoples. The nature of this threat, which could materialize at any moment, calls for an explanation and a clarification of the positions which should remove from the eyes of public opinion any mistake about the declared intentions of the Moroccan king on one hand and on the other about the efforts which Algeria, through the voice of its topmost leaders, has continued to deploy to avoid the worst.

President Chadli Bendjedid, the Algerian head of state and secretary general of the party [the FLN], reasserted without beating about the bush Algeria's position regarding the problems which exist in this region: "Algeria," he said, "has neither pretensions nor designs. Its only wish is to see a just peace prevail and it is ready to contribute to anything which is susceptible to achieve this peace in the interest of the peoples of the entire region including the Saharan people in the context of respect for the resolutions of the United Nations and the OAU. Algeria does not harbor any feeling of hostility vis-a-vis fraternal and friendly peoples."

Indeed, Algeria does not have a bone to pick with Morocco. Algeria has always respected scrupulously the recognized international borders of all neighboring states including Morocco. Specifically as regards the problem of Western Sahara, Algeria has asserted without subterfuge that the conflict opposes on one hand the Saharan people who have been fighting since 1973 for their right to self-determination, national independence, and respect for the territorial integrity of their country and on the other King Hassan II and his armed forces who have militarily invaded and occupied Western Sahara, thus taking the place of the former colonial power.

The problem of Western Sahara is and continues to be a problem of decolonization. The Saharan people, attacked and driven from their country, are waging an armed struggle against the forces of aggression fighting under the direction of the POLISARIO Front whose representative nature is recognized by all international organizations. Accordingly, it is appropriate to note that all military operations are carried out in Western Sahara and in southern Morocco by the Saharan People's Liberation Army and that these operations are the response to the policy of aggression of the Moroccan royal palace and its territorial expansionism.

These operations are planned and realized by the officers, noncommissioned officers, and fighters of the Saharan People's Liberation Army who hold the initiative in this respect and who have assumed control of the military situation in the field. Consequently, the operations which have served as pretext to the king of Morocco for making his decision are part of the process of the Saharan people's opposition to Moroccan aggression and occupation.

Because of this Algeria cannot but reject such accusations emanating from a regime in danger [of overthrow] and whose declared intention is to engulf part of the African Continent in an adventure with disastrous consequences. The real wish of the royal palace is to bilateralize a problem whose fundamental cause is Morocco's own creation of a colonial situation.

A war between Algeria and Morocco would never stifle the liberation struggle of the Saharan people, should these be the secret dreams of Hassan II. Quite the contrary, such a war would only reinforce the desire of these three fraternal peoples who have a common future to point their finger at the real enemies of the freedom of the peoples.

2662

CSO: 4400

STATE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE DISCUSSED

Algeris EL MOUDJAHID in French 8-9 Jun 79 p 1

[Editorial by H. A.: "Monopoly at the Service of the Economy and the Citizen or the Reverse?"]

[Text] The People's National Assembly continued on Thursday morning [7 June 1979] under the chairmanship of Mr Chibane its customary discussion on the government's bills or communications. Last Wednesday [6 June] it had been the turn of the minister of commerce, Abdelghani Akbi, to present the government's conclusions, this time devoted to the exercise of state monopoly on foreign trade. The numerous speeches of the deputies continued on Thursday --and will resume next Monday [11 June]--in addition to the discussion which followed on the previous day the government's communication premised primarily on the various problems encountered daily by the consumer for reasons that are fairly well known by everyone. The People's National Assembly gave the impression of being comfortable on the whole with the theme proposed during the 2 days of discussions, with some speakers of both sexes striving to raise the level of the discussion by an often complex analysis of international commercial relations which are not slated to benefit the capitalist system of exploitation. First, by virtue of the fact that it had already discussed the problem fairly extensively last year before approving the government bill on the state's monopoly on foreign trade, and then because of the subject's interest which reflects actuality sufficiently, the daily needs of citizens and the alas, "central" concerns of the market.

The theoretical awareness of the discussion did not prevent the deputies from exposing the reasons for the concerns of the primary victims of the deficient functioning of the commercial system in Algeria. Cases of irrational supply or anarchic distribution of consumer products--not always staples--are a reality which seems to have considerably disrupted the domestic market.

Who are its primary victims? The organs embodying the state monopolies--and only they--which are responsible for imports and exports? No. It is the country's over-all economic and social situation which suffers from it. But those who are essentially its primary victims are at times found among the consumers exposed to all kinds of vexations of the market and among the retailers or small businessmen who always "face the consumer."

The government's analysis of the operation of the state monopoly brings out, often in too implicit a manner, the real bottlenecks that can be designated as "bureaucracy" or the irrational nature of the internal organization of the national monopolies which evidence a real lack of motivation and aggressiveness. State monopoly is in fact the most rational instrument designed to solve the problems of foreign trade and susceptible to provide the responses necessary to the needs of the national market and the consumer. However, the deficiency stems from its exercise, often irrational or not in accordance with the needs of the national economy and the socialist goals of the state. This is undoubtedly the business of the government which has to discover its causes and participate in their elimination. On his part the citizen has a role to play as an actor-consumer who through his clearsightedness and his discipline or lack of it is responsible for the success or difficulties of this monopoly which is supposed to be at his service rather than the other way around.

2662

CSO: 4400

ALGERIA

DEFICIENCY OF MARKETING SYSTEM STRESSED BY MINISTER OF COMMERCE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8-9 Jun 79 p 3

[Article by APS: "Mr Akbi Stresses the Deficiencies of the Marketing System"]

[Text] Abdelghani Akbi, member of the FLN's central committee and minister of commerce made a statement on Wednesday [6 June 1979] about the operation of the state monopoly on foreign trade.

Speaking before the deputies of the People's National Assembly the minister of commerce, representing the government, listed the initial implementation measures of Law No 78-02 promulgated on 11 February 1978 relating to the state monopoly on foreign trade.

In his presentation the minister noted the various constraints facing his ministry, some flowing from the lack of specificity of certain provisions of the law while others are of a material, even structural, order.

Abdelghani Akbi also reported on the state of execution of the general import and export program for the year under-way.

Gigantism and Constraints

In his speech, the minister of commerce noted the deficiencies which the existing marketing system continues to witness.

Abdelghani Akbi felt that their causes are the consequence "of the gigantism of our domestic economic agents and also flow from the contradictions found in the allocation by the state monopoly on foreign trade itself among these agents and from the constraints flowing from the lack of precision of the law," he explained.

In order to remedy all these situations, the minister of commerce advocated the establishment "of a committee at the supraministerial level which may be charged with proposing regulations, even laws, for a realistic and over-all application of the principles raised.

"This committee will also have the complex task," he specified, "of proceeding with the redefinition of the import and export monopolies by taking into account the background and size of our enterprises."

The minister of commerce mentioned in his presentation Article 10 of the law on state monopoly in foreign trade which bars all middlemen. The article in question excludes in a general way "any intermediary whose only function is to collect a commission on operations involving Algerian foreign trade and in particular the Algerian suppliers and the foreign supplier connected with any public organ representing the Algerian contracting party."

"However," Abdelghani Akbi noted, "there is a limit to the extent that the idea which seems to prevail in our enterprises identifies the nonproductive foreign supplier with the intermediary targeted by the law."

The minister expressed the wish, while continuing to advocate the effecting of trade transactions directly with the producer or consuming partner, "that possible recourse to a nonproducing or nonconsuming foreign partner should not be prohibited." Abdelghani Akbi took into account on one hand the very provision of the law which does not expressly exclude such a thing and on the other hand the role devolving on him in the context of the existing organization of international trade.

"Another concept threatens to bring about bottlenecks in our supplies and the loss of some advantageous markets," he added.

The minister underscored the measures which have followed the elimination of the importation regime. These measures which tend to put an end to the quota system are reflected in the distribution of products among the 20 enterprises which fall under the jurisdiction of various ministries (Article 3 of the law). They are also reflected by the elaboration on 29 March 1978 of plans creating three new companies: SNIC [National Chemical Industries Company] for optics; SNMIB [National Printing and Office Equipment Company] for printing and office equipment; and SNMIA [National Food Industries Supplies Company] for supplies for the food industry.

In parallel fashion and in application of the provisions of Article 82 (b) of the law, the Ministry of Commerce, in order to obviate any bottleneck in economic activities, has continued to issue import licenses involving a small amount bearing exclusively on maintenance products, spare parts, and raw materials to private production enterprises.

As regards the export trade, Minister Akbi noted that the departments of the Ministry of Commerce were prompted to take temporary measures consisting mainly in the placing under license of all products for export, with the exclusion of hydrocarbons and fresh fruits and vegetables (monopolies of SONATRACH and OFLA [Fruit and Vegetables Office]).

Readjustment of the General Imports Program

After listing the constraints that have surfaced as regards imports, notably the rejection of the draft decrees calling for the creation of the three enterprises, the minister of commerce noted that the distribution of the products that are still subject to quotas undertaken since the promulgation of the law has to be pursued, notably, on account of the need to maintain for a certain time the issuing of the AGI [Over-all Import Authorization] to the local collectivities and the enterprises under their jurisdiction.

Measures were proposed by the minister to mitigate the constraints resulting from the deficient provisions of the law relating to exports.

An initial listing of the products exported by the private and public sector that do not have a monopoly being effected on the basis of the customs statistics for 1977, this noncomprehensive list must be completed by other products likely to be exported.

Abdelghani Akbi noted the need to envision the establishment of a transition period "which would be reflected," he said, "by the maintenance of the system of licenses for the marketing of surpluses that are not yet under the control of monopolies."

The minister of commerce expressed the wish, furthermore, that all producing public enterprises that do not have monopoly control should be authorized to export their surplus products.

The minister of commerce then informed the People's National Assembly of the readjustment of the PGI [General Imports Program] for 1979. An increase in the initial PGI of more than 7 billion Algerian dinars has finally been proposed and approved. "This additional amount," he explained, "is slated to satisfy the essential demand expressed by the operators on account of their investment program.

' This re-evaluation of the PGI has been made possible by the substantial anticipated increase of our hydrocarbon exports estimated at 35.55 billion dinars," he indicated.

The total of the investment program for the year 1979, the minister recalled, was set by the government at 65 billion dinars of which 16.4 billion dinars for the capital budget and 48.8 billion dinars for credits to enterprises.

At the conclusion of Abdelghani Akbi's presentation a discussion followed relating to it. The discussion will resume on Monday morning at 1000 hours.

2662
CSO: 4400

SUEZ CANAL AUTHORITY CHAIRMAN EXPLAINS INCREASE IN PASSAGE DUES

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 24 Jul 79 p 6 LD

[Excerpt] Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority Eng Mashhur Ahmad Mashhur has announced that the introduction of the new passage dues on ships using the Suez Canal will increase Egypt's revenue from the canal by \$50 million per annum.

The canal authority chairman said that the new rate of dues has been announced after a thorough study in which international consultancy firms and the international chamber of shipping took part. The Suez Canal Authority has taken into consideration the fact that the Suez Canal must remain the cheapest and easiest international shipping passage linking east and west and serving world trade.

He said that the increase applies only to dry-cargo ships and to the first 5,000 tons of a ship's cargo, while the old rate of dues will continue to apply to the remaining cargo, thus making the dues more compatible for small ships which receive services similar to those received by big ships and oil tankers.

Mashhur said that there is no increase in dues on the passage of oil tankers or ships carrying oil by-products or on ships carrying a combined load of petroleum and goods. It has also been decided to abolish the additional dues on a tanker's draft and width in excess of the limit allowed, which was equal to 12 percent of the total dues. The authority has also decided to reduce the fees for the use of its tugs, which accompany ships passing through the canal, in order to reduce expenses and encourage tankers to use the canal.

The canal authority chairman said that this is the first revision of passage dues since the resumption of shipping in June 1975. It has come as a result of changes in the world economic situation and the increase in oil prices and the consequent increase in shipping costs.

CSO: 4802

VIOLENT CLASHES IN MARIVAN BETWEEN KURDS, KHOMEYNI MILITIAMEN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 15 Jul 79 pp 1,2

[Article: "Outburst of Fire, and Bloodshed in Marivan"]

[Excerpts] Guardians' Corps: Affiliates of the KDP are to be blamed.

'Ezzedin-e Hoseyni: The catastrophe was brought into existence by reactionary landlords.

KDP: The incident was created by elements affiliated with the former regime.

Dr Mofti-zadeh: No accurate information is available to unveil the nature of the incident.

According to a report dispatched from Sanandaj by the correspondent of ETTELA'AT, the border city of Marivan was converted yesterday morning into a bloody arena of violent clashes between revolutionary guardians and armed groups. The latest casualty report was 26 dead, and approximately 60 seriously wounded from both sides.

Yesterday morning various groups embarked on a program comprising demonstrations and a march, to protest against the contents of the news-items broadcast and televised by the Radio-TV networks, while reporting on the developments of Kurdistan.

A 300-man group, armed with various kinds of weapons, arrived in the area where the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Committee is located in the city of Marivan. The armed men then asked the guardians stationed at the committee headquarters to hand over their arms, as a result of which a clash occurred between the two parties. The guardians' group was composed of 25 personnel, therefore the guardians' headquarters of Kermanshah was requested to send over auxiliary forces to Marivan, which were later airlifted to that city by helicopter.

In order to make an on-the-spot inspection, a 3-man investigation team, headed by Kaliji, the Deputy Governor General of Kurdistan, has been dispatched by helicopter to Marivan by 'Allameh Ahmad Mofti-zedeh.

According to another report, the situation prevailing in the border city of Marivan is very critical. As reported by witnesses, at present four different groups are stationed in that city: Guardians of Islamic Revolution; KDP members; Provisional Leadership, and personnel of Jalal Talibani's group.

The city of Marivan is located at a distance of 15 to 20 km from the Iraqi border, and at present its telephonic communications has been cut off from other areas of the country.

Views Expressed by 'Ezzedin-e Hoseyni:

According to information dispatched by the reporter of ETTELA'AT from Mahabad, Ayatollah 'Ezzedin-e Hoseyni has been quoted as saying, that during a protest march in Marivan, when the demonstrators were proceeding through the streets where the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Committee is located, all of a sudden they were fired at from the building, and then the demonstrators, in their turn, opened fire on the guardians.

Ayatollah 'Ezzedin-e Hoseyni has added, that according to information not confirmed yet, the reactionary landlords of the "Provisional Leadership" group have also taken part in recent developments.

Instigations by Landlords:

The correspondent of PARS NEWS AGENCY has filed this report in connection with the armed confrontation of Marivan:

A clash occurred yesterday in the border city of Marivan between armed groups, with a casualty toll of 22 dead, and 40 wounded, according to the Division commander of Sanandaj.

Disturbances occurred also last month in Marivan, and it was said then that they stemmed from the anti-revolutionary instigations of the big land-owners of the area.

The first group of the injured was airlifted to the hospital of Sanandaj yesterday evening, and the pilot of the helicopter described the city of Marivan as a place resembling a battlefield.

Demonstrators took to the streets again following the transfer of the wounded persons to Sanandaj, chanting all the time that the confrontation was a plot hatched by imperialist agents, aimed at deviating the course of Iran's revolution.

It was announced by the Division commander of Sanandaj, that a ceasefire was put into effect as of 1800 hours yesterday, and that the toll of casualties might be more than the number estimated so far.

A medical team has already been dispatched to Marivan, and a number of wounded warriors have been hospitalized at the Red Lion and Sun hospital of Marivan.

Toll of Casualties:

In reply to a telephone call by the reporter of ETTELA'AT to the residence of Ahmad Mofti-zadeh in Sanandaj, the latter's spokesman elaborated that at 10:00 o'clock yesterday morning demonstrations were staged in Marivan by leftist groups, and later a violent clash broke out between the and the personnel of the Revolutionary Committee of the city. He added, that an investigation-team has been sent to Marivan by Mr. Mofti-zadeh, and nothing could be said until the return of the team. The number of casualties, according to the same source, is reportedly 20 to 30 killed, and 70 to 100 wounded.

Barricades Erected in the Streets:

According to the spokesman of the Toilers' Society of Kurdistan, demonstrations were staged yesterday in Marivan by the Peasants' Union and other progressive forces, to condemn the news released by the Radio-TV network against Kurdistan. During the march a confrontation occurred between the demonstrators and the Islamic Revolutionary Guardians. The latter, accompanied by the elements of "Provisional Leadership," opened fire on the crowd from the adjacent rooftops, and then the demonstrators set up barricades and shots were exchanged. The same spokesman added, that though a cease-fire has been arranged, but the barricades are still intact in the streets. His estimate of the casualties was 15 people killed, and 35 wounded.

Role Played by Agents of the Former Regime:

Commenting on the bloody events of Marivan, the KDP spokesman in Tehran labelled "incorrect" the news released by the Radio-TV network regarding the recent developments of Marivan. Then he described the events as follows:

A group of the big land-owners of the area, including Sadiq Jaf, the notorious landlord, and a devoted mercenary of the deposed Shah's regime, had embarked on a provocative and anti-revolutionary plan, under the guise of an "Islamic Committee." The members of the group were in contact with the elements of the former Shah's regime, who are active along Iran-Iraqi border. These activities, unfortunately carried on openly under the name of "Islamic Committee" supporters, and against the revolution of Iran, caused great anxiety to the inhabitants of Marivan, and especially to the peasants of the area. Therefore, at the invitation of the Peasants' Unions, a march was organized by the peasants on the day before yesterday, aimed at protesting against the instigations of the anti-revolutionary landlords, affiliated with the regime of the former Shah. Finally, as a result of the operations of those elements, the peaceful march resulted in a violent clash, during which 13 Committee sympathizers, including 9 landlords, were killed, and 17 others were captured by the peasants. Also, in the course of this clash 4 peasants

were killed, and 9 were wounded. A number of the supporters of the landlords were also injured.

Dispatch of Military Units Denied:

As reported by the correspondent of ETTELA'AT from Sanandaj, according to latest information acquired from the border city of Marivan, tranquillity and peace reign at present in the city. A medical team, with necessary supplies and medicines, was dispatched this morning from Sanandaj to Marivan. In the meantime, contrary to rumors put into circulation concerning the dispatch of military forces to Marivan, so far [10:30 a.m.] no troops have been sent to that city.

Names of Casualties:

Fifteen of the twenty-six persons killed in Marivan are members of the Revolutionary Guardians, and investigations are underway to establish the identities of the other men killed during the clash.

KDP Supporters Opened Fire on Guardians:

According to the spokesman for the Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, 13 guardians have been martyred during the clashes of Marivan. He added, that the guardians' headquarters was surrounded in Marivan by 300 armed supporters of the KDP, aimed at disarming them. The guardians did not surrender and continued to defend their positions. Then a message was sent to the Guardians' Corps HQs of Kermanshah, requesting to dispatch auxiliary forces. This took a whole hour, during which time 13 of the 25 guardians were martyred. Rest of the persons killed were from the assailants.

The spokesman of the Guardians' Corps stated, that at present the city of Marivan is under the control of the guardians, and that peace and order prevail in the area.

Demonstrations Staged in Sanandaj:

According to a news-dispatch from Sanandaj, sent by the reporter of ETTELA'AT newspaper, more than 30 thousand people, composed of the members of the Freedom for Revolution group, Cherikhay-e Feda'iy-e Khalq, The Free Teachers, and Women's Organization of Sanandaj, rallied at the Freedom Square of the city, and then they started a march through the streets to protest against the attitude adopted by the government in Marivan. The demonstrators demanded the expulsion of the Provisional Leadership from Iran, and also required that the government keep the promises it has already given to the inhabitants of Kurdistan.

Other slogans chanted by the demonstrators were: "Kurdistan will be converted into a graveyard of the reactionaries"; "The Provisional Leadership should be expelled from the country."

The march was over at 7:30 p.m.

MASS MEDIA ACCUSED OF DISTORTING KURDISTAN NEWS

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 16 Jul 79 p 12

[Article: "Radio-TV Prepare Public Opinion for a Vast Offensive Against Kurdistan"]

[Excerpts] During a press-conference, held the other day by 62 representatives of the Peasants' Unions of the districts of Piranshahr, Oshnoviyeh, Lajan and Mangur, they condemned the distortion of news by the Radio-TV concerning the developments of Kurdistan, and the fact that the big landlords have been armed by the government. - -

Khaledi, representing the peasants of Jaldian village, said: Recently a group of landlords and reactionary agents possessing medals and decorations from the toppled Pahlavi regime, have been armed by the Imam's committee in Urumiyeh, and the local gendarmerie as well. Immediately after that they have exerted pressure on the peasants, asking them to make payments dating back to the year 1962 as property tax for the lands they have been cultivating since that date. This move has naturally created a violent reaction among the peasants, because the oppressed Kurdish masses could never expect to see the revival of the rotten system of feudalism after the revolution.

Continuing his comments, Khaledi added: If the government has armed the big landlords unknowingly, the peasants loyal to the Islamic Revolution informed the government that such a move was equal to rendering service to anti-revolutionary plans, but if it has taken that step knowingly, in that case the silence of the government is to be explained by us as a plot, worked out to create clashes and disorder in the area, aimed at bringing back the gendarmes to Kurdistan, who have played a criminal role there in the past. In reply to a question asked about the issues discussed during their visit to Ayatollah Khomeyni and Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, the representative of Lajan said:

Our visit was a successful one, and we do support Ayatollah Khomeyni's decisive stand against imperialism and internal reactionary elements. But, in the meantime, we condemn the shaky stand of the government against the difficulties existing in our area.

Mohammad 'Abdollah-nezhad, the representative of Mamesh village, noted that the government claims it has armed the landlords to have them guard the borders, whereas the peasants could act as the best guardians of the frontiers of the country.

With regard to the role of the "Provisional Leadership" Khaledi commented: The "Provisional Leadership" is an instrument in the hands of world imperialism and local reactionary agents. Wherever they set foot in Kurdistan, the landlords immediately started to create disturbances by their support. Moreover, the personnel of the "Provisional Leadership" have been acting as bodyguards for the Sheykh of Gazgaz and the Khan of Jaldian.

One of the representatives gave explanations about the methods of work adopted by the Peasants' Unions in Kurdistan as follows: Unions have been formed in most villages, and by the guidance and approval of 'Ezzedin-e Hoseyni we have resolved to bring into existence a general peasants' union in Kurdistan, in order that this body should defend the interests of the peasants against the big landlords. So far the unions have not accomplished anything in connection with the issue of land ownership, as well as questions dealing with production, and their activities have been confined, for the most part, to political indoctrination. However, in several villages the landlords have succeeded in obtaining, by force, ownership taxes, dating back to 17 years (from 1962 when the land reforms program was implemented), from the peasants, and no doubt that we are going to show reaction to this violent act of the landlords.

Discussing the question of the news-items relating to Kurdistan and reflected in the mass media, and especially released by the Radio-TV networks, one of the representatives said: The Peasants' Unions are supporting only the interests of the peasants, and are not related to any party or organization. Now, whenever they show any reaction against the violations of the landlords, their actions are being ascribed to the KDP. Of course, it is beyond any doubt, that the peasants do back the KDP or any political group which might support the interests of the toilers. We are of the opinion, that the release of false and distorted information on the Kurdish people by the "Voice" and "Image" of the Islamic Republic, is an effort aimed at paving the way for leading astray the public opinion, in order to justify the occurrence of a vast military aggression against Kurdistan. Landlords committing trespass, and their reactionary agents are being called "gallant people" by the Radio-TV stations.

Referring to distorted information published in "Jomhuriy-e Eslami" newspaper, one of the representatives made the following remarks: Bayazid Aria and Salim Ojaq, are two landlords of the area, and the newspaper in question has called them "oppressed" persons. Does this mean that "oppressed" persons are those who were previously getting privileges from the Shah, and now those privileges have been cut off?

The group representing the Peasants' Unions announced that it expects that the following points be taken into consideration by the government:

1. To arrest and punish Col Pur-Shahab, Gendarmerie commander of Jaldian, who has been engaged in regularly persecuting the defenseless people of the area, from the day he was appointed to that post.
2. To expel from the Jaldian garrison the false "mojahed's, who are creating trouble and plundering the people, and to recruit local personnel for maintaining peace and order.
3. To disarm the big landlords, equipped by the Gendarmerie of the area, who are advocating the restoration of the old feudal system existing in the relations of the landlords and the peasants.
4. To put an end to the poisonous propaganda campaign unleashed by the "Voice" and "Image" of the Islamic Republic, and reflected in certain newspapers, directed against the Kurdish people, with an effort to leave a negative impact on the public opinion of Iran.
5. To dispatch an equitable and impartial mission by the government, to examine and solve the difficulties existing in the area.
6. To compensate the damage and losses sustained by the suppressed inhabitants of the village of Jaldian, inflicted upon them during the assault on the garrison of the village.

CSO: 4906

GEORGE HABBASH ADVOCATES KHUZESTAN SEPARATISM

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 22 Jun 79 pp 20-21

/Article by Huda al-Husayni: "Does George Habbash Play a Role in the Arabistan Convulsions?"

/Text Before the recent Khuzestan incidents, the Iraqi ambassador met with Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, the Iranian foreign minister. During that meeting, the ambassador asked the minister whether the Iranian revolutionary Islamic government was satisfied with the agreement that had been concluded between the shah and the Iraqi Government and in accordance with which the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq supported by the shah had ended and the Arabistan area had become Persian Khuzestan.

Yazdi smiled at the question and said: "Who told you that we are satisfied with that agreement? The account between us and you is still open. There are many things we are going to demand of you."

During the press conference held by Hojat al-Islam Shabastari at the Hotel (al-Miriin) in Fas (during the Islamic conference), a gulf reporter asked him about the timing for the return of the three Arab islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb and Musa, to the Arabs.

Shabastari also smiled and said: "Who said these islands were Arab?"

Following this, the struggle erupted between two of the leaders of the Iranian "Islamic" revolution over the name of the Gulf, the struggle between Ayatollah Sadegh Khakhalí who, during his visit to the Gulf countries, echoed what Ayatollah al-Khomeyni had often repeated while staying at Nouvelle le Chateau in France, that is, the name "Islamic Gulf," and Dr Yazdi, foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose reaction was immediate: The name of the Gulf is the Persian Gulf, and so it will remain.

A current Iranian official told AL-HAWADITH: "During the era of the Safavids, that is, in the 15th century, everything up to Basrah (in Iraq) was under Iran's control."

The Iranian official went on to say: "With regard to the Gulf, historical maps and documents prove that the Gulf is Persian. Therefore, the average Iranian wonders about the purpose behind changing its historic name. Is the word Arabian prettier than the word Persian? If the Arabs like pretty names, why don't they change the name of the Dead Sea, making it the Sea of Life?" "As for the name Islamic Gulf, it is a pretty name on condition that this name applied to all the Arab countries. For example: The Syrian Islamic Republic, and the same for Iraq, Libya, Egypt, the UAE, etc. Then we won't object. However, if you want to change only our history, we do not agree." With regard to the islands, the Iranian official said: "The three islands used to belong to Iran and were unpopulated. There were a few fishermen who had been sent there to establish their Arab character. However, when the British occupation was over, all these British games fell apart and 'legitimate' Iranian forces entered. Even Bahrain used to be part of Iran. In older Iranian geographies (a few years before the independence of Bahrain), there used to be an asterisk above Bahrain and at the bottom of the map there was a footnote stating that Bahrain was originally an Iranian territory." Using the Gulf and the three islands as a starting point, the importance of Khuzestan emerges; an extremely important strategic area for Iran, overlooking the Gulf (Arab-Persian-Islamic) and neighboring some Arab countries. However, more important than all this, it is the heartland of Iranian oil that comprises the fundamental groundwork for the Iranian economic revolution. We must not forget that the strike of the oil workers in Khuzestan made "the shah's empire" subservient to the workers. These workers helped to make the al-Khomeyni revolution a success and assisted in getting rid of the shah. Also, they are either pro-socialist or pro-secular democrats. Khuzestan's geographic location has made most of its inhabitants Arab. Everyone remembers the constant rebellion in that area led by Shaykh Khazal, even though the forces of Reza Shah (father of the present shah) choked off that Arab voice.

However, the rebellion and demand for independence by the Arabs in Khuzestan and the Azers in Azerbaijan made Reza Shah sense that this spark could catch hold in the areas of the Kurds, Turkomen, Baluchis and Lurs and, in fact, could catch on in the Bakhtiar and Nahilati tribes (northern Iran). He, therefore, changed the name Persia to Iran, referring to the Aryans, believing that the word Iran would do away with the sectarian and tribal divisions and differences; Iran is a collective name, while Persia is a label that stirs up differences.

Even before the revolution, governments in Iran were aware of the importance of Khuzestan, since it held the biggest refinery in the world (Abadan) and oil facilities (the refinery is currently surrounded by 3,000 armed followers of al-Khomeyni to protect it). Because of the importance of oil, all Iranian naval forces are stationed there, although this force can play no role for fear of burning down the Abadan refinery.

The port of Khoramshahr is in Khuzestan, the biggest port in the south, not only for oil but for handling the food ships that feed all Iran. The threat is that if the Khuzestan workers close down this port, food cannot wait more and 15 days and then it spoils. Closing the port means cutting off food from the cities of Iran.

An Iranian official told me, commenting on what happened in Khuzestan: "The current calm is like the calm before the storm. The movement of Shaykh Muhammad al-Khaqani is not normal; it is the doing of the Palestinians. The Arabs there revolted because they have Palestinian elements in the oil facilities behind them."

The Iranian official went further than this unspecific accusation and said: "Timsar Darya Dar Madani (General Madani), the commander of the navy who, at the same time, is governor of the Khuzestan region, accused the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and mentioned George Habbash by name."

We have to make an explanation here to ascertain the reasons for the various schools, if we don't want to label them lines of thinking, that have begun to emerge among the people who earlier rebelled against the regime of the shah. There are now the Khomeyniites who dominate the Islamic revolutionary committees and attract most of the public, and who feel that the revolution is a general Islamic revolution, not an Iranian Islamic revolution, and, therefore, it must extend to all Islamic countries. Opposing it is the trend of Ayatollah Shariatmadari that attracts most members of the government from the prime minister, Muhammad Mahdi Bazargan, to the foreign minister, Dr Yazdi to the other liberal, sectarian and leftist parties and organizations. They say that the revolution was first launched against the shah's regime, and the national duty next calls for putting the Iranian house in order and, after that, comes other issues involving Islamic peoples. In other words, the revolution must be to serve Iran first.

The trend criticizes Imam al-Khomeyni for permitting the Palestinians to play a basic role in engineering new Iranian policy; it was they who were behind the ruling issued by Imam Khomeyni in which he decreed the Egyptian-Israeli treaty as against Islam, and it was they who were behind the appeal to isolate Egypt at the Islamic conference held recently in Rabat and made Pakistan and some Islamic countries which were hesitant about dragging the dispute among the Arabs over the treaty into the Islamic family, agree to the decision to suspend Egypt's membership after the Iranian delegation sponsored it. It was also they who influenced Imam al-Khomeyni when he absolved the left, the communists and the supporters of Moscow in the assassination of Ayatollah al-Mozaheri. Even Vinogradov, the Soviet ambassador in Tehran, thanked Hani al-Hasan (representative of the PLO who was transformed from a political adviser to 'Arafat into a political adviser for Imam al-Khomeyni) for the role he played in preventing the collapse of Iranian-Soviet relations. Leonid Brezhnev also sent a letter of thanks to 'Arafat in this regard.

The Shariatmadariites say that it was wrong to allow the PLO to open an office in Ahvaz, as this was a concession that had now been given to any country, large or small, and, in addition, the use of Palestinian military or oil experts is a dangerous action, the consequences of which cannot be sneezed at.

This clarification of the two principal trends that are engaged in a tug of war for control of the Islamic revolution in Iran should shed some light on the facts behind the disputes that are emerging between the supporters of al-Khomeyni and those of Shariatmadari, whether they involve the labeling of the Gulf, the fate of the islands or the policy that the new Iranian state must pursue with the Arab countries. However, is it true that, according to General Madani, the Popular Front, and George Habbash in particular, are behind the convulsions of the Arabs in Khuzestan?

The first quarter to give play to the role of the Palestinians in altering the current of the Iranian revolution from its independent religious course to a pro-Soviet course was a secret bulletin of the British ECONOMIST when it said that the Palestinians and Hani al-Hasan and Abu al-Za'im were working in coordination with the Soviets to overthrow the al-Khomeyni government. This accusation is superficial and ridiculous, because the Fatah group and Hani al-Hasan support the al-Khomeyni trend and try to help it avoid any mistakes in its foreign political attitudes. Moreover, Abu al-Za'im (a Palestinian military commander who lives in Beirut and who visited Tehran with Abu 'Ammar) has no role in Iran. The statements of the ECONOMIST represents wishful thinking on the part of the West more than something based on proven facts.

Now comes the role of George Habbash and the Popular Front and Iraq. The Iranian official whom I mentioned--security precludes my mentioning his name, to avoid embarrassment--says: The Palestinians transported their ideological differences to Iran. While Fatah chose Imam al-Khomeyni, the PFLP, it would appear, picked the non-religious trend, that is, the liberals, leftists and the supporters of Moscow, and today is trying to sell the Arabistan operation to Iraq.

The official then went on to say: The Khuzestanians may be convinced that the time is ripe to demand independence, as the Kurds are doing. This, however, does not stop this Arab movement which is trying to split the Iranian state, from being a suitable instrument for the Iraqis to exploit. They say that the Iraqi state has the right to take military measures on the Khuzestan frontier on the grounds that its security is threatened. Who know, it may begin to extend a helping hand to the Arabs of the region exactly as the shah of Iran did when he extended a helping hand to the Iraqi Kurds and then used them as a bargaining chip to get Iraqi recognition--the first of its kind in Arab history--that Arabistan was an inseparable part of the Iranian state. What is to stop the Iraqis from playing the same game to regain in the era of the al-Khomeyni revolution what they gave away to the deposed shah? The Iranian official sank further into his pessimism, saying: There is a vast plan to sabotage Iranian-Arab relations which the al-Khomeyni revolution restored, whose issues it unified and made all secondary disagreements solvable. This plan is not just American, but is American-Soviet. The unity of the Arabs and Persians is a threat to the interests of both countries, particularly if this unity is based on Islam. What the Americans are now working for is to cut off the head of the Iranian state by cutting away

Khuzestan, leaving the body inflamed with its religious sentiments to be a motive force for the Islamic minorities in the southern Soviet Union. The Americans will thereby have achieved their fundamental target, oil and weakening the recalcitrant Iranian revolution. The secession of Khuzestan would mean that our country would wither away.

The issue that preoccupies the minds of those who were victorious over the shah, whether Khomeyniites, nationalists, liberals or leftists, is: What will be the end result of this agony that Iran has begun to endure as the result of the continued hostility by the two great powers of the world? The Khomeyniites put forward no solutions. Apparently they so far have no clearcut plan. They still dominate the emotions of the people, and every time they find themselves facing an eruption or crisis or problem they call on the people to come out in a demonstration in support of their positions. When the demonstrations are over and the people return to the homes and work, they find someone asking the next question: "What has changed since the departure of the shah?"

Hence the differences in attitudes. The Khomeyniites resume talking about the Islamic revolution which can survive and triumph over its enemies only if it extends to encompass the broad geography of the Islamic world. The Nationalists, liberals and leftists, who operate behind the facade of Shariatmadari, say that the Iranian people rose up against the shah and his injustices and his regime, not to unify the Islamic world: Iran first and Islam second.

It would appear that the national front that was headed by Dr Karim Sanjabi (who participated in the Bazargan government and then resigned) has become the target of an indirect attack by Imam al-Khomeyni. He chose to make a hostile illusion to Dr Muhammad Mossadegh, whom the national front regards as a symbol of its struggle, saying: "We do not only want to liberate Iranian oil, but rather we want to liberate Islam."

The supporters of the front understood that the attack had been opened against them, particularly when Imam al-Khomeyni criticized "everyone who dares to demand a democratic Islamic republic." In his reference to them, he went so far as to say: "Muhammad Reza Khan (meaning the shah) used in any case to mention God and go to visit the holy places; these people, however, don't mention God."

The response of the nationalist current was strong. The odd thing was that it came from the head of the Iranian national oil company, Hasan Nazih, who said: "There are 800,000 Iranians trying to get passports because of the delays of the revolutionary committees. Even I have expressed my disagreement with the statements of the imam, because he always criticizes the violators of human rights. Were it not for them, we would have no imam at all. Therefore, Imam al-Khomeyni must reverse his errors in some way or other." He then warned that were the present situation to continue, it could lead to a coup.

An Arab ambassador in Tehran said: If the Americans and Russians succeed in breaking up the unity of ranks that the al-Khomeyni revolution achieved between the Arabs and Persians, they will have accomplished their main objective. However, how can they not succeed if the unity of ranks among those who rebelled against the shah is split asunder? When they deposed him and took his place, they begin to disagree.

8389

CSO: 4902

STATUS OF FOREIGN ENTERPRISES DESCRIBED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 7 Jul 79 p 3

[Article by Ulrich Encke (Tehran): "If We Break the Contracts, We Suffer: Nationalization Plans in Iran. Foreign Investors Still Need not Worry."]

[Text] For the Western economic circles in Iran the case is clear: Whoever says A must also say B. The revolutionary council and the revolutionary government in Iran have adhered to this wisdom.

First, the entire banking system has been nationalized because a scapegoat for the persistent economic crisis had to be found. Bank managers and foreign investors, still connected with the former Shah regime--so goes the official version--would impede the reconstruction of the economy in postrevolutionary Iran; in the long run, their economic interests would be served best if first of all the entire economy broke down completely.

The country's 36 banks, of which 9, to be sure, had already been under state control before, have been nationalized, and the bank management replaced. Only the Islamic Bank, founded by the revolutionary clergy, and the Russo-Iranian Bank, which is 100 percent Russian State-owned, have not been nationalized. Shortly thereafter, the entire insurance industry was nationalized. Here also, foreign influence was to be forced back and the management replaced.

Predictable Step

The next step was therefore predictable: the now executed nationalization of extensive parts of Persian industry. Are the augurs right after all when they call Moscow's evil influence behind the development in Iran? Is the designation "Islamic Republic" nothing but the elegant paraphrasing for an order that allows eastern concepts and in which there is no room any more for the economic interests of the capitalist countries?

The answer is a clear no. In spite of all the official government's word acrobatics, the Islamic revolutionaries have no concept of a political order. Just as until now there has been no concrete concept of an Islamic economic order, understood as a third road between capitalism and communism, so, too, there is no definite decision in favor of one or the other of the economic blocs.

What many conceive of as the socialization of Iran is nothing else but a desperate crisis management where tomorrow's problems are not yet being given any thought. After all, the political left in Persia is criticizing the government's nationalization decisions as half-hearted, lacking a concept, and unable to bring about structural changes. "Enterprises and production units in the private sector, whose financial conditions are in order--so says the law--are recognized by the government as independent industries; under consideration of the ownership conditions described, they are fully supported by the government."

Nationalized were first of all the enterprises which faced total collapse: that is those enterprises whose owners either fled abroad or who were arrested on charges of perpetrating economic crimes. Some 51 industrialists were named here, who altogether controlled over 300 enterprises in Persia. Then all those enterprises were nationalized whose bank obligations are larger than their assets and anticipated earnings.

Had the government not assumed responsibility for these enterprises, mass bankruptcies would presumably have been the result. Blinded by the richly flowing petrodollars and under the imprint of the Shah's megalomania, the state bank underwrote in recent years private credit programs with whose aid an industrialization of the country was pursued without paying any attention whatsoever to consumer demand. Imperial economic nepotism and corruption contributed to the frequent flow of money into the most nonproductive areas.

Confronted with unemployment of around 3 million, out of a total labor force of about 12 million Iranians, the government had presumably no alternative in the present phase but to take charge itself with securing these jobs. "We succeeded," said Prime Minister Bazargan, "in overthrowing the Shah's diabolic regime, but we must take cognizance of the bitter fact that we must live with this system's legacy."

Of course other and also more important branches of Persian industry have also been nationalized: the metal and steel processing industry, copper and aluminum processing enterprises, as well as the entire shipbuilding, aviation, and motor vehicle construction sectors. But real nationalization was carried out only in the automobile industry. The other industries had already been subject to far-reaching state guidance and control. Moreover, the banks have branched out far in their participation in the industrial sector. The state's seizure of these enterprises was therefore sealed at the latest with the nationalization of banks, carried out a month ago.

There are other reasons why until now no use has been made of this possibility: In the banking sector, the management, to be sure, was replaced at that time, but otherwise nothing was changed. The Islamic principles in the banking business--that is above all the elimination of interest, perceived of as exploitation--have not been put into practice; a concept for a new banking policy has until now not been proposed. Furthermore, there have been considerable difficulties with the newly appointed bank managers: Several directors declined

their appointments--some because of the lack of banking-policy guidelines, others because their salary was to have been reduced to one-tenth of their former income.

In the face of the threatening economic situation, the revolutionary government took refuge in a formal nationalization; in this connection, nationalization was conceived of not as a tool for problem solving but as the problem solution itself. In the meantime, they have apparently realized that without foreign economic aid--wheresoever it may come from--there is no way out of the crisis.

In any case, at the end of last week, Prime Minister Bazargan made an aboutface of 180 degrees: If until then the foreign investors had been thoroughly reviled as exploiters and destroyers of Iranian economy, the prime minister now suddenly rebuked those who drew logical conclusions from this propaganda and demanded the discontinuation of foreign projects in Iran. "It is true that millions of rials flowed into the pockets of foreign merchants who participated in these projects. But the final results of some of these projects will be beneficial to our country. We must therefore not immediately look at all these foreign projects as nonsensical."

Bad Energy Supply

The prime minister continued: "People attack Western imperialism and demand that we now dissolve all these contracts with foreigners. But these foreigners have already received the largest part of the money on the basis of the contractual commitment; if we break these agreements, it is we who will have to suffer, not the foreigners."

Here we can see for the first time why, in spite of all verbal revolutionary radicalism, most Western investors in Iran are not pessimistic at all about their economic future in the new Islamic republic. German enterprises will presumably also profit from the noticeable opening up towards foreign countries: Thus, it is relatively certain that in the light of the country's catastrophic energy supply situation, the conventional power station, tended on the Caspian Sea by a German syndicate, will almost certainly be completed. But at the German KWU [power station union] one can also hope anew that construction of the controversial power station project Bushire on the Persian Gulf will continue.

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CSO: 4403

IRAQ ASSUMES NEW IMPORTANCE AFTER VISIT OF FRANCE'S BARRE

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Jul 79 p 3

[Article: "Husayn Assures Barre of 'Continued and Secure' Energy Supplies to France"]

[Text] Baghdad: Raymond Barre's visit to Iraq was a complete success. The French prime minister achieved all of his objectives; the structure for more extensive and intense political, military, economic, and commercial cooperation was established. These are the conclusions which one can draw from the clues furnished by the two parties at the end of the marathon 48-hour negotiations held not only between Barre and his counterpart, Vice President Saddam Husayn, but also in the bilateral commissions comprised of experts in each of the various fields.

The banality of the terms of the communique published Tuesday, 10 July, could be illusory. The two parties have not announced any spectacular agreements. Besides, that was not the objective of the meeting. But it is known that Iraq, which intends to break the monopoly held by the USSR in the supply of armaments, may buy from France aerial, naval and telecommunications equipment, as well as other material, a purchase which requires more in-depth studies.

Saddam Husayn assured Barre that France could count on "continued and secure" energy supplies. Whatever the developments of the international situation may be, Iraqi oil will continue to flow into French reservoirs. "Whenever you have a problem with this matter" said the Iraqi vice president, "we will help you solve it." This is a very interesting promise considering that deliveries of Iranian crude have fallen from 16 million tons in 1975 to, in all probability, 6 million tons this year. Already Baghdad has reportedly committed itself to raise from 25 to some 30 million tons the portion reserved for France which is thus assured of a third of its fuel imports.

It should be noted that 4 years ago Iraq furnished some 10 million tons only. "We will never forget your positive attitude, your consideration for our situation at one of the most difficult periods of our history," said the strong man of Baghdad to explain the friendship he showed for France. "You have been the only Western power to recognize the legitimacy of our decision, a few years ago,

to nationalize the oil companies. Again, you have been alone in withholding support to the Kurdish rebellion, and not to plot against the central government in Baghdad," he added by way of example.

The "Osirak" affair has had protracted results. The Ba'thist regime accepts in full the Paris version concerning the sabotage of the La Seyne nuclear reactor last spring, and is confident that Paris will conduct a full investigation. "Everything which has been undertaken in certain quarters to cast suspicion on our intentions so as to poison Franco-Iraqi relations has failed," a high French dignitary said. The contract will be scrupulously implemented, and the reactor will be delivered to Iraq as scheduled in 1982, perhaps with a slight delay of several weeks--a delay needed to repair the damaged parts, this individual explained. Without waiting for the end of the investigation, Iraqi officials have not hesitated to accuse the Israelis and perhaps the Americans as well of being responsible, both for the attack and for the "venomous campaign" set off in certain newspapers, notably the NEW YORK TIMES. Moreover, these are theories which well-informed French quarters do not at all rule out.

The understanding, then, seems complete. Members of Barre's entourage do not cease to praise the Ba'thist leaders.

Everything militates from here on out in favor of an evolution from simple agreement to the kind of coordination which would make Iraq the cornerstone of French policy in the Near East. The conversations revealed a notable "convergence of views" on all subjects brought up.

1) Energy: Both parties believe that the new world economic order--which should be based on harmony--cannot be built without the oil sector. The needs of industrialized nations should be satisfied in exchange for which these countries should take measures to eliminate waste and to accelerate the production of substitute energy products. Husayn and Barre both believe that "massive and abrupt" price increases--like those of nearly 50 percent from the beginning of the year--would undermine the world economic order, and would hurt both producers and consumers. Iraq proposes a slow but steady climb of oil prices which would take into account the rate of inflation in the advanced countries. The Third World countries would be compensated by funds furnished by an international organization financed by the industrialized and petroleum-producing nations.

It was pointed out that at no time did Husayn raise the issue of resorting to the "oil weapon" for political ends. "We are opposed to demagogic slogans", said Tariq 'Aziz, member of the RCC. "In the actual state of affairs, we do not intend to brandish this threat which, under different circumstances, would be perfectly legitimate."

2) The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Like France, Iraq is convinced that the Washington Treaty cannot result in an overall settlement which would mainly satisfy the Palestinians. For the moment, Baghdad does not have an alternative to propose, while the Geneva route seems unproductive and undesirable insofar as it would include the two superpowers. Europe should play a central role, particularly in persuading the United States to adopt a more balanced attitude with regard to the two antagonistic parties.

Meanwhile, Husayn has expressed great concern regarding the possibility of widespread hostilities which would be set off in Lebanon by a military confrontation between Israel and Syria. To avoid such a drastic development which would have the effect, among other things, of resuscitating a confrontation between the West and the entire Arab world, the two statesmen have agreed to exercise a moderating influence in Lebanon, to reinforce the authority of President Sarkis and his army, to defend Lebanon's territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty, and arabness.

Tarek 'Aziz, who is in charge of relations with Damascus in the council of the revolution, notes that Syria will do everything in its power not to fall into the trap set by Israel. The United States and Israel's other unconditional friends should know already that in the event of a military attack, say in Lebanon, the Arabs would reply with every available means, "including the oil weapon."

3) Iran: Saddam Husayn's second problem; the anarchy reigning in this country is liable, according to him, to lead either to an explosion or to a communist regime. Iraq wishes to contribute to a "normalization" in Tehran, failing which destabilizing factors could spread to the banks of the Euphrates.

Nevertheless, leaders in Baghdad are assuring their foreign interlocutors that their regime is sufficiently strong to "nip in the bud any attempt at Shi'ite or Kurdish subversion."

4) Turkey: Always concerned with stability and equilibrium, Iraq will provide the government of Ankara with the means, primarily financial, to face the dramatic hardships which are assailing it. Cooperation aimed at eliminating Kurdish irredentism on both sides of the border is steadily increasing.

In brief, as Saddam Husayn told Barre repeatedly, "Iraq will do everything possible to consolidate economic stability and international policy," not so much out of altruism as necessity. No matter what one may claim, Iraq is situated at the epicenter of an explosive area which threatens alarmingly all regimes, regardless of how strong they may be today.

CSO: 4800

FRENCH-IRAQI TRADE PROSPECTS IMPROVE

Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 16 Jul 79 p 5

[Text] A correspondent in Paris writes:

The prospect for Franco-Iraqi trade appear rosier than at any time in the past five years, officials said here last week as Premier Raymond Barre returned from a 48-hour visit to Baghdad. It was announced that Iraq, already France's second source for crude, has agreed to boost sales to its biggest customer by 5 million tonnes this year to 30 million tonnes; this is equivalent to about 28 percent of French needs.

Iraqi number two Saddam Hussein was quoted as telling Mr Barre: "any time you have a problem with the supply of oil we shall help you." The French Premier in turn expressed satisfaction with Iraqi "moderation" on prices and said that he and Mr Hussein discussed "measures to protect economies from massive and abrupt increases in price."

This was a far cry from the complaints of OPEC's "deplorable" decisions which emanated from last month's Tokyo summit, where France and six other major Western countries were represented.

France's oil imports from Iraq last year totalled about 9 billion francs (\$2.1 billion) but the bill will be far higher this year. It is however likely to be partly offset by a substantial rise in French exports of military hardware and other technologically advanced material. A consortium including the French companies Fougerolle and Spie Batignolles was awarded a FF 3.4 billion (\$810 million) contract in May to build and equip Baghdad's new international airport. Work on the three-year project began last month.

Two months ago, Iraqi Defence Minister Adnan Khairallah signed a FF 6.5 billion (\$1.5 billion) order for French weaponry including 40 Mirage F-1 warplanes. Informed sources in Paris told this newsletter that Iraq, which has expressed interest in the new generation of Mirage 2000s and Vedette Rapide fast patrol boats, would soon place new contracts with French arms manufacturers.

Mr Barre was accompanied on the visit, his second to Iraq since he became Premier three years ago, by the head of the French Atomic Energy Commission, Michel Pecquier. Sources said the Iraqis accepted the French government's explanation of an explosion--said to be the work of saboteurs--which in April damaged a 70-MW experimental nuclear reactor ordered by Iraq. The French assured the Iraqi government that the reactor will be delivered on schedule by 1982, though there may be a delay of a few weeks to repair damaged parts.

One very important aspect of the visit was the emphasis given by each side to the other's political and diplomatic influence. Mr Barre described Iraq as "a stable and organised" state within a highly volatile region. Mr Hussein briefed Mr Barre on Iraq's fears that military confrontation between Israel and Syria in Lebanon could lead to a generalised conflict and both sides agreed to exert a moderating influence, in particular with a view to reinforcing the authority of Lebanese President Elias Sarkis, sources said.

The two men also discussed Iran, where, Mr Hussein said, there was a real risk of civil war or of a communist takeover. But the Iraqi leader said his government was strong enough to counter any threat of subversion of its kurdish minority or Shiia Muslim majority from Iran.

The Iraqis also told the French that they intend to do whatever they can to help neighbouring Turkey overcome its difficulties, notably by providing financial aid. They expressed concern about the risk of instability in that country and urged the Europeans to help in resisting the threat.

CSO: 4820

FRENCH, SPANISH ARMS WORTH \$2.5 BILLION FOR IRAQ

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 30 Jun-6 Jul 79 p 47

[Article by D. Curcio: "French and Spanish Arms for Iraq"]

[Text] Iraq could in a short time acquire Spanish and French armament worth up to \$2.5 billion, as one more proof of the new independent line it is applying to its foreign relations. In such an event, Moscow should be able to understand Iraq's independent stance since Iraq has received the bulk of its armament from the Soviet Union for over a decade.

Saddam Hussein, vice president of the Revolutionary Council, is the spokesman for the policy of noncommitment with any bloc, which has also been demonstrated by the invitation to western countries to participate in the Iraqi economy. At the same time, and still within this policy, Hussein has told Moscow that the "friendly" relations between the two nations should not be affected by the suppression of the activities and members of the Iraqi Communist Party.

Moscow and Bagdad may find differences in their viewpoints on subjects related to the Arab cause, but they are "strategically allied" against imperialism and in support of the national liberation movements. Nevertheless, it is evident that Moscow is uncomfortable with the political direction taken by Bagdad. As a start, Iraq invited American and European firms to come into the country to advise the regime on clearing the way for the imports that will come later from the United States and Europe. As a consequence, imports from the Soviet bloc to Iraq have diminished.

Playing With Oil

Now, the independent policy of the Bagdad regime has been broadened to include supplies of arms which until a short time ago were in the Soviet domain exclusively.

The minister of defense, Adam Khayrallah, after an inspection tour of the arms industries of Spain and France last May, appears to have recommended

awarding contracts to Spain worth \$90 million, which would include warships. It is also expected that Spain will receive contracts to build factories in Iraq for the production of military vehicles and light armament.

Simultaneously, there have been talks at an official level aimed at doubling Spain's imports of crude oil from Iraq to \$1 billion by 1980.

The acquisition of French armament by Iraq is expected to reach \$1.6 billion over the next five years.

Eventually, France will become the principal supplier of armament to Iraq and Spain will be in third place. As with Spain, Iraq has committed itself to be the principal supplier of crude oil and will thus increase its exports to France from 20 million tons in 1978 to 25 million tons in 1979 and to 30 million in 1984.

From France, Iraq will receive 60 Mirage 2000 fighters, a radar system, guided missiles, and guided missiles ships. It is speculated that French arms experts could go to Syria, with which, at the same time, Iran is negotiating for the purpose of merging the two states.

Some observers in Beirut think that the turn by Bagdad in favor of Spain and France had its origin in the Soviet refusal to supply armaments in Iraq and Syria that would--according to statements by the two Arab governments--reestablish the strategic balance with Israel in defensive forces. The balance was broken when Egypt signed the bilateral peace treaty with Israel, which meant freeing Israeli forces previously needed on the Egyptian border for deployment against Syria, which now needs the support of Iraq.

9615

CSO: 3110

INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS COMMEMORATE REVOLUTION

Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 16 Jul 79 p 6

[Text] Iraq last week announced that 23 industrial projects worth of total of Dinars 480 million would be launched to mark the 11th anniversary of the July 17 revolution. The biggest single project to be inaugurated includes the first and second generating units at the Hareth power station in Basrah, completed at a cost of ID 142 million (\$483 million), with a high-tension station and back-up unit east of Baghdad coming a close second at ID 140 million (473 million), the daily Ath-Thawra reported.

Three cement and light concrete plants are due to be formally opened. They are the Hammam al-Aleel plant, built at a cost of ID 17 million (\$57.5 million) and with a capacity of 500,000 tonnes of cement a year, the ID 4 million (\$13.5 million) light concrete plant in Basrah, which has an annual capacity of 156,000 cubic metres, and a cement plant in the Upper Euphrates region costing ID 60 million (\$203 million).

Four factories producing building blocks are due for inauguration, two of them in Baghdad. One costing ID 14.2 million (\$41 million) will have a capacity of 300,000 cubic metres a year on completion, while another, already finished at a cost of ID 12.2 million (\$41.2 million), will be able to produce 120 million blocks a year. The foundation stone will be laid for the Saladin building blocks plant, being built at a cost of ID 13 million (\$44 million) and with a potential annual output of 120 million blocks; the fourth plant is at Qadsiya, but no other details are available on this project.

A ceramics factory built at a cost of ID 3 million (\$10 million) in Ramadi will turn out 6,000 tonnes of porcelain a year, while the second phase of a factory producing dry cells will be inaugurated in Babylon. A car body assembly plant will be opened in Alexandria and a woolen textiles factory in Arbil built at a cost of ID 9.75 million (\$34 million) will start production. Details of other projects are not yet available.

IRAQ DENOUNCES IRANIAN EXPANSIONISM

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 30 Jun 79 p 5

[Text] "AL-THAWRA" and "AL-JUMHURIYAH" newspapers yesterday published articles in their inside pages on the Iranian rulers aggressive campaign against Iraq.

In its article which was published in the second page AL-THAWRA newspaper said under the heading "The Rulers of Iran and the Double Game":--

"The escalation of the aggressive campaign by the Tehran rulers against Iraq and their continuous threats for the Arabism of the Gulf and the sovereignty of the Arab land lead to more than questioning and indignation.

The Iranian rulers know very well that their involvement in a conflict with the Arab Nation will certainly lead them to a losing battle and accordingly the negative outcome of such conflict will not be in the interest of the Iranian peoples who have been looking forward to get rid of dictatorship, chauvinist tendency, sectarian domination, colonialism, imperialism and the agents of Zionism.

However, the statements given by the officials in Tehran and other Iranian states is a firm evidence that these rulers are practising the dirty conspiratorial game which has been earlier practiced by imperialism, Zionism and their agents in the Arab region.

The slogans and the banners are no more deceiving anybody in Iran because those who suffer from all types of oppression by the Shah and Savak are still under a bitter submission and racial oppression by the new rulers, their committees and the guard of Khomeyni.

Furthermore, these slogans will not also deceive anybody outside Iran because the threats to intervene in other affairs and threatening the security and the independence of the neighbouring countries are only traditional methods created by colonialism. Previously the Arab revolution and international liberation movement had confronted and denounced these methods for contradicting with the principles of justice and the human rights.

The behaviour of the rulers in Tehran is big conspiracy including the Iranian complexes and in fact these complexes are not different in their core and reality from those dominated the mind of the Shah and his generals.

Accordingly, the fate awaiting the new rulers will be worse than that of the Saha and the near black days awaiting them will certainly make them repentant."

AL-TIAWRA newspaper published another article in the same page on the internal disputes in Iran.

The newspaper said:-- "According to the newspapers of the Iranian regime and the international news agencies, the Iranian peoples are stepping up their resistance for the racial discrimination policy of the new ruler in Tehran. The heroic resistance of the sons of our people in Arabistan is one of the aspects for that popular resistance.

The state of chaos and strikes prevailing all the cities and the villages of Iran is a direct outcome for the escalation of the internal disputes.

Furthermore, the areas inhabited by the non-Persian nationalities are witnessing violent actions and bitter resistance against the guard of Khomeyni in protest against the constitution which has not included any reference to the accomplishing of these nationalist legitimate ambitions.

However, the Tehran rulers imagine that they are capable through their stupidity to cover the state of chaos and instability in Iran by publishing only falsehood and allegations in their newspapers."

Writing in its second page, AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper said yesterday under the heading "Iran's Rulers... Where With Their Illusion".--

"Since the inception of the July 17-30 Revolution Iraq's foreign policy has been characterised with an established tendency in setting up close cordial relations which ensures respecting the principle of sovereignty and the non-intervention in the internal affairs.

The Michavallian tendency of the Iranian new regime's foreign policy will never influence our relations with the world peoples and in particular with the Iranian peoples with whom we are linked by Islamic and historic ties going back to hundreds of years.

By escalating their campaign of distortion against Iraq and its valiant Revolution, the Iranian mass media will not gain but more illusions that lead them to isolation and fall.

Furthermore, the new rulers' determination to maintain the three Arab Islands shows that the new rulers in Tehran are playing with fire by attempting to draw the attention of the Iranian peoples to an illusion which the former regimes failed to perpetuate.

The attitude of the new rulers in Iran is not only contradicting the logic of Islam which rejects aggression on the rights of others, but it is also harming the international relations and the humanitarian ties between the two neighbouring countries.

The aggressive spirit of the new Iranian rulers logic confirms a clear fact which indicates that the stand of the Iranian rulers is part of a series of plots sponsored by imperialism and Zionism.

The escalation of the aggressive move by the Iranian rulers against Iraq following the success of the Baghdad Summit Conference aims at wrecking Iraq's active role on the Pan-Arab arena because the Iranian rulers realize very well that making Iraq busy at this stage will serve the imperialist-Zionist alliance and its conspiratorial plans against the Arab Nation and its legitimate just issues."

CSO: 4820

IRAQ GIVES AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 2 Jul 79 p 3

[Article by J.M.]

[Text] The Iraqi Vice-President, Mr. Taha Muhyiddin Ma'rouf and Premier of Arab Yemen Republic, Mr. Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani, signed on June 4 the letters of exchange between the two countries.

According to these letters, Iraq is to offer 300 million dollars aid, through the Iraqi Fund for Foreign Development, to support the Yemen economy for carrying out a number of projects during the coming five years. These projects include roads, hospitals, schools, artesian wells and youth houses and centres.

In assisting the Arab countries, Iraq embarks from its national policy for helping the brotherly states to raise their peoples standard of living and of keeping them independent from foreign aid which mostly has strings attached and which that restrict their independent policies.

Thus, while extending the services of several hundred teachers to Algeria and Mauritania in North Africa to reinforce their campaigns of Arabisation and their educational systems, it sends experts and technicians to help Somalia, on the Red Sea, to run the jointly-built oil refinery, and South Yemen to carry out developing projects.

In fact, it is difficult to compile the assistance granted by Iraq to its brother-countries because it is continuous and every now and then finds new scope.

Last year, for example, an Iraqi school was opened in Djibouti to teach 850 pupils Arabic language and history. It also awarded over 12,000 text books to the school.

The construction of oil refinery in Mogadishu is considered the largest individual project built by Iraq abroad till now. It cost ID. 9 million (about 28 million US dollars) and has a capacity of 500,000 tons annually.

Besides the refinery, an Iraqi agricultural delegation led by Undersecretary of the Agriculture Ministry, Mr. Hassan Yousef Abed, paid a visit last month to Somalia to inspect Iraqi-financed oil seeds and animal production projects expected to be completed in the near future.

Opposite Somalia where Arab Republic Yemen lies overlooking the Red Sea, Iraq opened a few years ago a special bureau to execute various developing projects which the \$300 million loan mentioned. The office had already constructed a 10 km. highway linking Sanaa' with the centre of the capital at a cost of ID. 420,000 (about 1.5 million US dollars). It also started building a circular road around the Yemen capital which is estimated to cost ID. 1.3 million (about 4 million US dollars).

The director of the bureau said that Iraq is now undertaking one of the vital projects in Yemen, the construction of 40 schools at a cost of one million dinars. Already 5 primary and secondary schools were completed, the rest are expected to be finished this year, the director added.

Last January, a special envoy of Republic of Yemen signed in Baghdad a contract with the Iraqi Fund for Foreign Development through which it was granted a 15 million dollars loan for the construction of a new airport at "Hodeeda," the second largest city in Yemen.

On the other hand, a team of 41 geologists left Baghdad to Sanaa' on March 24 to dig 25 artesian wells for drinking and for irrigation.

Two years ago, Iraq set up with Aden government a joint fishing company with a capital of 30 million US dollars. It bought four fishing vessels of large and small sizes and decided later on to increase the fishing fleet by two more to meet its growing activities.

Jordan which has recently enhanced its relations with Iraq in various fields received last October a 30-million dollar loan to improve its conditions. Upon signing the loan in Baghdad, Mr. Suleiman Arrar, the Jordanian Interior Minister said the accord "stresses Iraq's practical and principle national stances."

If we go further to North Africa, we find that Mauritania is getting the largest Iraqi aid after Egypt (before it was suspended). Sending of teachers was not enough to improve Mauritania's conditions. It was agreed in the wake of a visit by its Labour Minister, Dr. Yusuf Diacans to Baghdad on November 29 last year to set up a 40-bed hospital with all its equipments and laboratories, in addition to a number of medical centres.

Iraq also agreed a few months ago to establish a TV station that will help in improving the campaign of Arabisation there in addition to realising other purposes.

The Iraqi team which visited Somalia in May also made a tour to Mauritania where it put final touches on the establishment of a 20 million dollar joint company for fishing.

As for Egypt, Iraq's economic and financial aid is estimated at several million dollars and was suspended after Sadat signed the surrender 'treaty.'

In reviewing Iraq's aid to the Arabs in different fields, we cannot forget its political and military assistance. The Iraqi Army fought with the Arabs in resisting the Zionist aggression in 1973 and units of the Popular Army fought with the Lebanese and Palestinians to stop the Zionist invasion of South Lebanon last year.

After all Iraq's help to its brothers in general is considered limitless, it is growing more because it comes from a pure Arab progressive heart eager to protect the Arab homeland from its enemies and is concerned of raising its standard and position in the world community.

CSO: 4820

TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON BRITAIN LIFTED

Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 16 Jul 79 p 5

[Text]

Iraq has agreed to lift trade restrictions imposed on Britain last year in retaliation for the expulsion of 11 Iraqi diplomats in London. The decision was announced during a 24-hour visit to Baghdad last week by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, who said that "a new page" had turned in relations between the two countries.

In exchange, Lord Carrington agreed to give sympathetic consideration to an Iraqi request for a bilateral economic agreement similar to that which Iraq has with France. This falls in line with Iraq's policy of seeking closer trade links with technologically advanced Western nations.

British exports to Iraq in the first four months of this year were worth about \$118 million; this represents a fall of over 18 per cent on the average for 1978, when exports to Iraq totalled \$430 million. If the pattern were to continue until the end of 1979, this year's export total would be little higher than the total for 1977, which was \$334 million. British imports from Iraq, 98 per cent crude oil, were unaffected by the trade embargo and reached about \$1 billion last year.

Iraq's number two, Saddam Hussein, also agreed in talks with Lord Carrington to look into the life prison sentence passed last month on Christopher Sparkes, a Briton accused of economic espionage. Mr Sparkes, 52, contracts manager for the construction firm Wimpey, was arrested last autumn after Britain expelled 11 Iraqi diplomats in the wake of a former Iraqi Prime Minister's murder in London. Iraq retaliated by expelling 10 British diplomats.

It is not clear what goods Iraq would like to import from Britain under the projected economic accord, but one possibility is offshore oil-drilling equipment. This is a field of technology in which Britain has made great strides since the discovery of North Sea oil. The major fields for British exporters to Iraq in the recent past have been electrical apparatus and non-electrical machinery; there is a declining trade in transport goods.

ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION STATIONS NEARING COMPLETION

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 27 Jun 79 p 5

[Article: "Work Continues on the Implementation of the High-tension Project"]

[Excerpt] Currently in the governorate of al-Qadisiyah a project for high-tension electricity is being implemented at a cost of 70 million dinars. The general directorate for large electricity projects of the Public Electric Company is executing it.

Mr Kamil Yusuf Hammadi, the resident engineer of the project, spoke to AL-JUMHURIYAH of the importance of the project. He said: "The first stage of the high-tension electric project has been put into operation. This stage included the opening of substations in al-Harithah, Khur, al-Zubayr, al-Nasiriyah, al-Qadisiyah, and East Baghdad.

These stations already account for 1100 kilometers of high-tension lines.

This project--the second stage of which, it is anticipated, will be completed during the coming year bringing the total expenditure for both stages to 110 million dinars--will double the electrical capability in the country since it will increase the available electric power, and generate enough to cover the demands of economic growth and development, and answer the need of national developmental plans.

The resident engineer indicated that the substation in al-Qadisiyah governorate is part of the first stage of this large project. Its cost will amount to 7 million dinars, not including the cost of the power lines. It was implemented by a French company which was the original contractor. This station, which is considered a connecting link for the transmission of electricity from al-Harithah, in southern Iraq and to al-Qa'im via two high-tension power lines with a voltage of 400 kilovolts; one will conduct electricity from al-Nasiriyah via 180 kilometers of line and the other line--188 kilometers long--will be erected for the transmission of power to the eastern Baghdad substation.

The station will include a principle transformer with a capacity of 250 MVA for transforming voltage from 400 to 133 kilovolts. It is linked to eight lines each with a voltage of 133 kilovolts, two of which are joined to the Diwaniyah substation, two others joined to the Shamiyah substation, one tied to the gas-powered generation station in Najaf governorate, in addition to three reserve lines. It is hoped that these eight lines will be completed and put into operation in the coming year during the festivities of the national holiday of the July Revolutions.

BRIEFS

JAPANESE CEMENT FACTORY--Two Japanese companies have won a contract worth 50 billion Yen (\$230 million) to build a cement factory in Iraq, about 250 kilometers north of Baghdad. The factory is to be completed by the middle of 1982 and will produce approximately two million tonnes of cement a year. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 16 Jul 79 p 5]

CRACKDOWN ON COMMUNISTS--An expected crackdown on Communists in Iraq seemed to have begun last week, when the ruling National Front issued a statement accusing Communist party leaders of acting as agents of Israel and the US. The allegation was the most serious since last summer, when 21 Communists were executed for allegedly trying to subvert the armed forces. The executions provoked an exodus of Communists, many of whom have fled to the Soviet Union, leaving virtually no party structure in Iraq. Two months ago, the National Front, which is dominated by the Iraqi Baath party, warned the Communists to make up their minds quickly whether or not they wished to remain partners of the Baath in the six-year-old governing coalition. While Baath officials have maintained that the state of relations with the Communists is a purely internal affair, a remark by Iraqi number two Saddam Hussein last week indicated that developments in neighbouring Iran might have something to do with the Baath's attitude. As our Paris correspondent reports, Mr Hussein told visiting French Premier Raymond Barre that Iraq was concerned that there might be a Communist takeover in Iran if the situation in that country deteriorated further. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 16 Jul 79 p 6]

OIL-TANKER CONTRACT SIGNED--A contract with a foreign firm was signed yesterday for the purchase of Iraq's fifth oil tanker at a cost of about six million dollars. The tanker, which could carry 12,500 tonnes of oil by-products, would be delivered next April. The new tanker would join the Iraqi oil vessels operating in the Arab Gulf region. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 4 Jul 79 p 4]

NEW JAPANESE TANKER ORDERED--Iraq last week signed a contract with an unidentified Japanese firm for the purchase of its fifth oil tanker at a cost of about \$6 million, the Iraqi news agency reported. It said the tanker, capable of carrying 12,500 tonnes of petroleum by-products, would be delivered next April. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 9 Jul 79 p 8]

LIME FACTORY FROM POLAND--Iraq last week signed a \$50 million contract with Poland's state trading agency Polimex-Cekop for a lime-producing factory to be built at Karbala, 100 kilometres south-west of Baghdad. Polish companies are already building three cellular concrete factories in Karbala, one of which is due for completion soon. Lime is a basic raw material for producing calcium-silicate bricks and cellular concrete. The Polish firm Zremb Amalgamate will build the lime factory in association with Maerz of Switzerland; general supplier of equipment will be Makrum-Zremb of Bydgoszcz. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 9 Jul 79 p 9]

ITALIANS WIN IRAQI CONTRACTS--Iraq's Ministry of Mining and Industries has awarded an unnamed Italian company two contracts worth a total of Iraqi Dinars 27 million (\$91.4 million) to establish two brick factories in the Kadissiya and Saluhuddin districts. Aggregate capacity of the factories, which are due to be completed within 19 months, is 240 million bricks a year, while the projects are estimated to create 400 jobs. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 9 Jul 79 p 10]

DUKAN HYDROELECTRIC STATION PLAN--29 Jun, Baghdad--Yesterday Muhammad Ayish, a member of the RCC and minister of Industry and Minerals, signed in the office of the ministry an agreement with a Japanese firm for the establishment of a hydroelectric station in Dukan at a cost of 16.5 million dinars. The project which will be completed in 34 months aims to exploit the stored water power, which is accumulated by the Daribandikhan dam, and to transform it into electricity within an integrated project to construct hydroelectric stations which will include three units with a total capacity of 242 megawatts. The residential neighborhood will include the building of 40 houses and residential facilities in addition to test tunnels, water culverts for the dam, and the setting up of maintenance work at its installation. It should be noted that this station which will be linked into the national network by six 132 kilovolt lines immediately upon their completion is the fourth such station to have been set up since the outbreak of the glorious 17 July Revolution--along with the construction of the Sammara hydroelectric plant with a capacity of 84 megawatts, the Dukan hydroelectric plant (400 megawatts), and the Hamarin hydroelectric plant (50 megawatts). [Excerpt] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 29 Jun 79 p 4]

CCO: 4-10

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

LAND SEIZURE BILL PROTESTED--Several hundred Bedouin demonstrated this morning near the Knesset building, protesting the bill which is to settle the issue of appropriation of their land to build the Negev airfields. The demonstration was unique in that there was not a single slogan or poster. The Alinment has asked that MK Hamad Abu-Rabi'a be asked to a meeting with ministers Ehrlich and Tamir to look into possibilities of settling the matter without legislation. The Alinment demands that public figures, including Arabs and retired judges sit on the committee to investigate claims about lands, and not officials. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 24 Jul 79 TA]

CSO: 4805

JORDAN

BRIEFS

PRICE HIKES IN OIL PRICES--Today Prime Minister Mudar Badran issued a defense order raising the prices of the petroleum products produced by the Jordanian Oil Refinery Company. According to the defense order, the price of one 12.5 kg cylinder of liquid gas will become 1,300 Jordan dinars in the Amman and Al-Balqa' districts and 1,350 Jordan dinars in the remainder of the country. The price of one liter of high octane gasoline will become 130 fils for the consumer of gasoline stations. The price of one liter of ordinary gasoline for the consumer from the gasoline stations will become 105 fils. The price of one liter of kerosene will become 30 fils for the consumer from fuel stations. The price of one liter of diesel oil for the consumer from fuel stations will become 24 fils. The price of one ton of fuel oil will become 11 Jordan dinars. The defense order will go in effect tomorrow, 27 July 1979. [Summary] [Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 2100 GMT 26 Jul 79 JN]

CSO: 4802

GUERRILLA LEADERS IN SOUTH LEBANON DISCUSS OPERATIONS, MORALE

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 22 Jun 79 p 20

[Article by Walid Zahr al-Din: "Guerrillas on Battle Line With Israel; Resistance Instructs Fighters To Retreat to Forward Position and Engage the Enemy; New Military Tactics To Oppose Zionist Attacks; Abu Diyab Says, 'Israel Is Making Preparations for South Lebanon 2 Operation;' What Is the Cat and Mouse Game Between Guns of the Resistance and Israeli Airplanes?"]

[Text] The Location: a Palestinian position in South Lebanon located near al-Naqurah where the headquarters of the UN Emergency Forces are located, a stone's throw from the borders which Sa'd Haddad had laid down for the Free Republic of Lebanon.

The Time: about a week before the eve of renewing the mandate of the UN Emergency Force in South Lebanon.

The General Atmosphere: a state of red alert among the ranks of the resistance while Israeli land, air and sea attacks on the area continue. Possibilities are increasing that Israel may be preparing for a broad, new attack called "South Lebanon 2." The Tel Aviv government had called its attack in March 1978, "South Lebanon 1."

The question that is being posed is this: When will Israel carry out its anticipated attack? Are the Palestinian Resistance and the Nationalist Lebanese Forces prepared to oppose and to confront this attack?

Abu Diyab, the official in charge of this forward position smiled as he listened to the question because the Palestinian fighter in this area is always fully prepared. In Abu Diyab's view the answer to the question is known beforehand and predetermined, especially since Abu Diyab has been living in the South of Lebanon since 1969 after having served in the Jordanian army for 7 years.

"But the problem is not so much that of preparedness as much as it is that of the extent of your capabilities in confronting the vicious Israeli attack and the repeated Zionist aggressions!"

Abu Diyab pondered the question briefly, and then he answered calmly and confidently, "Let us begin with the targets of the Israeli attacks on South Lebanon. In recent weeks these attacks have been excessive and may not be dealt with lightly. On the one hand, the basic goal of these attacks has been to make the people and the population evacuate South Lebanon. On the other hand these attacks seek to force the citizen of South Lebanon to lose faith in the Palestinian Resistance.

"But the result has been exactly the opposite, and the reason has very simple. The citizen of Lebanon does not doubt for one moment that the origin of his tragedy lies in aggressive Israeli intentions against him and against his land and his people. Evidence for this lies in the fact that Israel shelled many villages in the South, none of which has a single Palestinian post and most of which do not have a single Palestinian guerilla."

We Expect Broad Operations

Abu Diyab added, "We are noticing at present that the enemy is reinforcing his military forces along the borders and inside Lebanese territory. The enemy has also taken up new positions along the border strip that is controlled by the militias of Sa'd Haddad.

"On our part, we did try to take some measures. On the one hand, we bombarded the enemy's positions inside Israel and inside the border strip area. On the other hand, Abu 'Ammar decided to close the resistance offices in the city of Tyre and to compensate those who suffered damages or losses as a result of the recent Israeli attacks.

"As far as our forces are concerned, the morale of our people is very high, and they are always fully prepared to confront any unforeseen development from the enemy. Recently we noticed that the enemy has been conducting airplane and naval reconnaissance missions continuously, day and night. We are, therefore, expecting Israel to carry out broad military operations."

"Do you expect these operations to be more ruthless than they've been in the past?"

"It is possible. The enemy can take up new positions and can fortify them, especially in al-Bayyadah, in Tayr Hafa, al-Jibbayn, al-Naqurah, Balat and Miruhin. We have obtained detailed information about these positions after intensive reconnaissance operations we recently carried out."

Relations with the Emergency Forces Are Good

"To what extent can it be said that closing the offices in Tyre has contributed to the return of normal life to that city?"

"The fact is that the citizens who were forced by the recent Israeli attacks to leave South Lebanon have gradually begun to return. On our part, we support their return, and we also support the return of Lebanese law to any area in Lebanon. We have no desire to stay in or to keep any inch of Arab territory. The only thing that we are seeking is the liberation of our land."

"Do you have normal relations with the UN Emergency Forces or have these relations suffered some setbacks?"

"We have good relations with these forces, and we have an understanding with them on all subjects. Naturally, there is a dividing line. But we are helping the UN force free Lebanese territory from Israeli presence. We are asking that the emergency forces enter the border strip area and spread themselves among the Zionist entity until the Lebanese borders. They can thus block the inroads that Israel had made on the area with the help of the separatist militias."

Our Military Capabilities Are Superior

"Let us return to the military matters. Do you have enough weapons that would enable you to defeat any broad Israeli attack?"

"The objective of the enemy was and still is to destroy our military forces. But he has not been able to achieve this because we have been pursuing military tactics that differ from Arab military tactics. Our tactics are based on dividing ourselves into small groups of fighters armed with light weapons that are used in guerilla warfare.

"The weapons that we have now are superior to those we had in the past. We have also mastered their use, more so than in the past. Experience has also taught us how to confront future battles and how to oppose them militarily and administratively. We have learned how to fight the enemy more fiercely."

Abu Diyab smiled and then went on to say, "Let me assure you that the Israeli soldier is a coward. This is what we have learned from our contact with him and from our fight against him. He cannot take action unless a hovering airplane gives him cover and naval vessels prepare the way for him. This is a fact that is well known to our fighters who will remain constant to the principle of 'War to defend every inch of Arab land because it belongs to all Arabs'."

"As fighters in forward positions against the enemy, what are you asking from the Arabs?"

"The fighter in the Joint Palestinian Lebanese forces is hoping that a national unity in all political, military and economic areas can be achieved between all the Arab countries."

Retreating to Forward Positions

No sooner had Abu Diyab stopped speaking than scores of guerillas assembled around us to find out what was going on. Their nerves which are tuned to all possible actions in South Lebanon make them forever wary of a strange face that appears in their midst. Everyone was carrying his weapon and an ammunition pouch around his waist. After everybody sat down, we began to talk about existing conditions in the South and the methods of the military tactics that the guerillas were using in that area. The most important of these tactics are the following:

The forward retreat: Guerillas do not retreat backwards; on the contrary, they retreat to a forward position.

Why do they do that?

Fighter Fu'ad, a guerilla who had taken part in repelling many Israeli attacks against the South says, "There is a simple reason for this. Israeli airplanes, and sometimes naval vessels, bombard forward positions in the North where the Israelis are headed rather heavily and intensely. Such bombardment makes it easy for the Israelis to move swiftly. For this reason, instead of retreating backwards where the air raids and the raids from the sea would be at their worst, the guerillas retreat to forward positions to engage the advancing Israeli forces."

Fu'ad adds, "The fact that the guerillas depend on a guerilla warfare and the fact that they have been rigorously trained in that discipline makes their efforts to engage the enemy successful. The guerillas seem to be capable of inflicting heavy losses upon the enemy's ranks. It is for this reason that the guerillas usually carry light weapons that are suitable to the nature of this war."

The Cat and Mouse Game

The Small Groups: Fu'ad says, "It has been noted that guerillas in South Lebanon are divided into small groups. This is based on the fact that a small group can change its position in a manner that makes it impossible for the enemy to detect its exact whereabouts."

Constant Change of Position: This change of position includes not only the guerillas; it also includes weapons, including heavy weapons.

In this regard Fu'ad says that this tactic did confuse the enemy in all of his attacks on South Lebanon, especially during his major attack in March 1978.

He adds, "At that time we used to place a gun at a certain location, for example. After about one quarter of an hour of firing the gun, we would change its position a few hundred meters. Then Israeli airplanes would bombard the first location fiercely while the same gun would be shelling Israeli troops from the second location."

"And then again after about a quarter of an hour and perhaps less, we would take the gun back to the first location. Then Israeli airplanes would shell the second location while we fired the gun from the first location.

"This was how we operated our guns, and they were heavy guns. We played a cat and mouse game with the Israeli forces, especially with the military airplanes."

Reconnaissance and Wireless Communications

The fourth method used in military tactics is that of concentrated and continuous reconnaissance to enable the guerillas to determine the time when Israel intended to direct its attacks against them. Accurate reconnaissance is considered one of the most important requisites for the success of other methods, especially that of constant change of position. In such a case guerillas become capable of selecting the appropriate times for moving to other locations.

In this regard Abu Diyab related to us a certain incident as he shows us the house that was destroyed during one of the recent Israeli raids near al-Rashidiyah Camp. Abu Diyab said, "this house was one of our military positions. We were detaining here the brother of Abu Iskandar who is one of the separatist officials in the border strip area. But we had released him in exchange for guerillas.

"Naturally, we expected this house to be shelled after Abu Iskandar's brother had pinpointed its position to the militia command and to Israel. So we moved to another position, and a few hours later, the Israeli airplanes came and demolished this two-story house. And here it is now: stones scattered here and there."

The fifth method is considered one of the most advanced military methods: it is the ease with which wireless communications take place. Abu Diyab says, "Wireless communications are considered one of the most important requisites for success in modern military battles. As far as we are concerned, it may be said that these communications are at their best. And this is what most regular Arab armies lack. Can you imagine that if, God forbid, I were derelict in the execution of my duties in any battle against the enemy, the lowest ranking fighter with us can pick up a radio and contact Abu 'Ammar directly and notify him of the matter?"

Life and Death Together

The guerillas continued presenting the methods they used and the experiences they have had. It was simple to observe during the conversation the high morale that the fighters had as they narrated the details of the actions which they had taken against the enemy and as they explained the extent of the preparations they had made to confront Israel and the militias that were allied with it in the border strip area.

Fighter Fu'ad said, "Just think that during one of our battles against the enemy a man whose name was al-Haraki (Abu Faras) was killed in action. His family lived in Kuwait. We contacted them and told them the news and asked that one of his relatives come to Beirut to find out what was to be done with the body.

"On the following day the late man's brother arrived and I met with him and tried to console him. I asked him, 'Where do you want to have the body buried?' He said, 'When your fighters die in action, where do you usually bury them?' I told him, 'In the cemetery of those killed in action.' Then he said, 'Abu Faras chose to spend his life with you; do you want to be separated from him in death? Bury him with your people who died in action. I am certain that after his death he would only want to stay by your side'."

Fu'ad went on to say, "The late man's brother asked me, 'Where is my brother's gun?' And I told him, 'Here it is!' He said, 'Please keep it with you. Keep it for me. I am going to Kuwait, but I am coming back to fight with you. No one will carry my brother's gun but me'."

This story demonstrates the high morale among the fighters. For them dying in action is easier and more honorable than living under peace treaties with Israel.

On our way back we noticed that the al-Rashidiyah and the al-Bas camps around Tyre had turned into an area where shelters abounded. The population here chose to live underground instead of marching off, leaving their homes, and surrendering. Heroism grows from the land whence the spring of the just Arab question is to thrive.

Abu Diyab, who is in charge of the forward position, talking to AL-QABAS reporter.



8592

CSU: 4802

SHI'ITE MUFTI AL-YAHFUFU URGES BA'LABAKK, JUBAYL STAND FIRM AGAINST MILITIA

Lebanon AL-SAFIR in Arabic 28 Jun 79 p 5

[Article: "Al-Yahfufi in His Meeting with Families in Ba'labakk and Jubayl states: 'We Shall Block the Driving out of Residents in Both Areas; Defense of our Brethren Protects Our Own Existence'"]

[Text] Ba'labakk Shaykh Sulayman al-Yahfufi, the Mufti of Ba'labakk, emphasized that what the militias in the area of Jubayl are doing is not different from what the Zionists in the south are doing.

The above statement was made in a meeting held yesterday at the Husayniyyah [Shi'ite Center] in Balabakk. Those attending included representatives of families living in the area of Ba'labakk and al-Hirmil and representatives of residents living in Moslem villages in Jubayl.

The meeting was opened by Shaykh al-Yahfufi who pointed to the persecution which the Shi'ite community has had to face throughout history. He emphasized that the Shi'ites believe in self-sacrifice and martyrdom. He observed: "What is happening in Jubayl at the hand of the sectarian isolationist militias is not different from what is happening in the south where the Zionists commit aggressive acts against the Shi'ite villages. Whereas there we have an external enemy, in the area of Jubayl we have an internal enemy."

He added: In the past, hundreds of members of the Shi'ite community died because of their identity as Shi'ites. What took place in Moslem villages in the area of Jubayl where the inhabitants are Shi'ites testifies to this. In the south, the Israeli enemy at present expands at the expense of the Lebanese crisis. Presently our sons also in the area of Jubayl face harassments at the hands of the isolationist militias. The aim of this harassment is to drive them from their homes and their villages.

He continued, clarifying: It is not possible for the residents of these villages to resist unless they receive support. The inevitable

result will be either that they would be driven out and partition follows or that they will be annihilated. All of this would serve the purpose of the isolationists.

He emphasized that the residents of the areas of Ba'labakk and of al-Hirmil have family, national, and emotional ties with the residents of Jubayl. "The residents of Ba'labakk will fight Moslem and Christian isolationist militias in the area of Jubayl. We must defend the lives of our brethren and of our kinsfolk in Jubayl and make it possible for them to remain on their land with dignity. We must also block the driving out of members of the Christian communities from our area."

He added: The isolationists aim at expelling the Shi'ites [from Jubayl] into our area as a preparatory step towards driving out the Christians from our area to Jubayl. But we assure the isolationists that we are one cohesive unit in this area, both Christians and Moslems; we will frustrate the designs of these mercenaries.

He went on, clarifying: The isolationists in the area of Jubayl surrounded some of the villages and even dared to kill their people; they violated people's honor and took money and property. This demands a call for a holy war. But I do not ask you to defend Jubayl while I stay here behind. I intend to move at the head of you because defense of Jubayl means the frustration of the plans of the isolationists-zionists.

Al-Tahiri also demanded that the Arab deterrent forces should enter the area of Jubayl to protect the residents "for these are legal forces and keeping peace on Lebanese soil has been entrusted to them."

Al-Tahiri also called for volunteers and for contributions "since defense of our brethren means defense of our own existence."

Following this, Hasan Mahmud al-Miqdad spoke on behalf of the residents of Jubayl. He spoke on the current state of affairs in the area of Jubayl and of the killing of innocent people by armed militias. More than 21 persons have been killed, and the last one killed was al-Hajj Dahar al-Miqdad who was assassinated 5 days earlier. Al-Miqdad also referred to actions taken by the Kata'ib against women, children and old people.

'Abbas Shams then spoke: The area of Jubayl is an extension of the area of Ba'labakk-Jubayl and its families belong to this area and therefore we must keep silent at these provocations.

'Izzat Kilan demanded the securing of necessary arms "for battle against the isolationists" whereas 'Abbas Zu'aytir emphasized that the militias, in their actions in Jubayl, eventually aim at proclaiming a sectarian isolationist state. He continued: The road between al-Biga' and Jubayl

has been cleared by the Arab deterrent forces but the Lebanese army there is unable to confront the isolationist militias. It is necessary for the Arab deterrent forces to intervene to keep the peace in the area of Jubayl.

At the conclusion of his address Zu'aytir called for volunteers and for national conscription.

At the end of the meeting a committee on volunteering as well as an executive committee were formed of the following persons: Sa'ud Harb, 'Abbas Shams, Ghazi Salman, 'Ali Ja'far, Husayn al-'Abdallah, 'Isam Mazlum, Subhi Hamiyyah, 'Abd-al-Karim Fayad, 'Ali Sa'dun Zu'aytir, 'Ali Jabir, Qasim al-Masri, Muhammad Ahmad Talyas, and Subhi Ja'far.

9378

CSO: 4802

'LEBANESE FORCES' BUS LINE CONNECTS AL-DAWRAH, JUBAYL

Lebanon AL-NAHAR in Arabic 29 Jun 79 p 4

[Article: "A [Bus] Line Connecting al-Dawrah and Jubayl to be Followed by Other Bus Lines"]

[Text] On 28 June, Shaykh Bashir al Jubayyil, commander of the "Lebanese Forces," and a number of military chiefs opened a bus line for commuters. The line connects al-Dawrah and Jubayl and operates under the name of Lebanese Forces--Internal Transportation.

Shaykh Bashir said: "The project had been planned a long time ago, before the recent incidents in 'Ayn al-Rummanah, in view of the transportation difficulties between Beirut and other points in Lebanon as there is no common means of transportation resulting in chaos when commuting. It is hoped that this line will solve part of the problem. Transportation at the moment is effected sometimes by fleecing where people are forced to pay a large amount of money to commute between Beirut and Jubayl. Workmen and clerks who live outside Beirut face difficulties in commuting. If our project succeeds--and I believe it will--we will open new lines to other places, particularly the mountains. Once the Syrians begin to withdraw from Mukallis and Sinn al-Fil and from the other places on the southern outskirts of the city, we hope to extend our bus lines to all Lebanese areas."

He explained that among the owners of buses and officials who have been working in this field for many years, there has been minimal initiative shown in the past. "We have requested them to renew their initiative and to reactivate the bus line and we, in our capacity as Lebanese forces, will give them the necessary assurances as regards the operation running well, concerning protection, and the like."

He also stated that there were other development projects being considered by the Lebanese Forces but that these projects "await a suitable time for execution."

A bulletin issued by the Fifth Branch of the Lebanese Forces states:
"The leadership of the Lebanese forces, sensitive to the needs of those people who have to contend with the rise in the cost of living, and willing also to participate in alleviating the difficulties of commuting which reflects badly on the economy, has established a transportation line connecting al-Dawrah and the city of Jubayl to operate under the name of Lebanese Forces--Internal Transportation."

According to the plan, the line will have five large transport buses scheduled to run from six in the morning till five in the evening. A bus will start a run every half hour from six to nine in the morning and one and four in the afternoon.

During the remaining hours a bus will start a run every hour. The buses will stop at the following stations: al-Dawrah, Jall-al-Dib, Antilyas, Dubayyah, Sarba, Junijah, Tabarja, al-Bwar, al-Safra', Jubayl.

The price from al-Dawrah to Antilyas is 50 piasters, to Juniyah 100 piasters, to al-Safra' 150 piasters, to Jubayl 200 piasters.

9378

CSO: 4802

MAURITANIA

NATION STILL INVOLVED IN SEARCH FOR SAHARAN PEACE

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 79 p 33

[Article by M.D.: "One Lieutenant Colonel Chases the Other; What Does the Future Hold for the New Strong Man of Nouakchott?"]

[Text] For the third time in less than a year, the Mauritaniens were shaken by events. Once again, last 27 May, astounded and distressed, they wondered what the next day would hold. The prime minister, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Ould Bousseif, the strong man of the regime, was killed in a plane accident off Dakar. Four days later, the CMSN [Comite militaire de salut national; Military Committee for National Safety] gave itself a first vice president in the person of Defense Minister Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydala, on whom it bestowed at the same time the functions of prime minister. However, the man in the street had not yet reached the end of his surprises. On 3 June he learned that President Mustapha Ould Salek, head of state since the coup of 10 July 1978, had resigned. That day in Nouakchott as the 15 members of the CMSN met at the residence of the president of the Republic, President Mustapha Ould Mohamed Salek -- whose role had become only honorary since 6 April 1979, when Lieutenant Colonel Ould Bousseif, at the head of a group of officer, had stripped him of the essentials of his powers -- asked that his prerogatives as head of state be restored to him. The proposal was put to a vote. Defeated, President Ould Salek resigned. "If I did not resign immediately on 6 April," he specified, "it was to prevent a split within the armed forces and a disruption of the country."

Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Ould Ahmed Louly, minister of public administration and of training of cadres, who is known as a "manager," above the clans but also the highest ranking military official within the CMSN, was appointed head of state and president of the CMSN. At the age of 36, he took over the presidency, but with the limited powers which the outgoing president held since 6 April.

Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydala, the new prime minister, appears to be unquestionably the "strong man" of the new team. The third to ascend in less than 12 months. He is referred to in Nouakchott as "a

man with a grip." Born in 1940, from a "large tent," a native of the former Spanish Sahara, this "Sahrawi" (belonging to a Reguibat tribe) knows the problem of the Sahara well. Known as a "progressive," immediately following the coup of 10 July 1978 in which he played a major role, the new prime minister is now looked upon as a "nationalist," a "pragmatic" dedicated "to the interests of the country."

This appointment brings the authors of the military coup of last 10 July back to the forefront of the political scene: Commander Boukreiss and Lieutenant Colonel Ahmadou Ould Abdallah, chief of staff, to the detriment of those who were close to the dead prime minister, who had not, any more than he himself, participated in the July 1978 overthrow. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Ba Ould Abdelkader becomes minister of education, a delicate position at the time when the problem of arabization is arousing opposition in the high schools.

The task of the new prime minister will be tough. The disastrous condition of public finances and the tension of the last few months between the Moorish and the Black African ethnic groups are the two main problems of the moment on the domestic level. The military expenditures -- in spite of the truce observed by the Polisario Front since 11 July -- still absorb 50 percent of the budget. The debt has reached \$750 million and the new team is counting on the help of friendly nations, specifically Saudi Arabia, to avoid bankruptcy.

But, once again, the essential condition for Mauritanian reconstruction is the solution of the Saharan conflict. Numerous Mauritanians today no longer understand the reason for keeping their forces in the Thiris el-Gharbia, the portion of the Sahara allotted to Mauritania. But the government will have to be cautious. It has declared itself in favor of the right to self-determination for the Sahrawi people and it intends to pursue contacts with the Polisario Front. For their part, the guerrillas are turning a deaf ear. The truce is not being broken, but the Polisario Front rejects any discussion not based on the document signed in Tripoli on 23 April last, between the Mauritanian minister of foreign affairs and the Libyans, and which makes provision for the transfer of Thiris el-Gharbia to the Polisario Front. The Mauritanians, who officially deny the existence of such an agreement, have refused to go to Tripoli on 26 May to meet with the Sahrawi emissaries.

This novel filled with surprise twists concerning the control of power and the quest for peace, Mauritania is still bogged down in this search for solution to the Saharan conflict. While the new leaders seem to be insistent on their desire to renew diplomatic relations with Algiers, they nevertheless have 8,000 Moroccan soldiers on their soil. For the defense agreement which had been concluded with Morocco is still in effect, and they do not want to put their privileged relationships with Senegal and France in question again.

Will they be able to continue this game of balance much longer? Maybe they are being offered a way to salvation from abroad, the Saudi settlement proposal offered by King Khaled to Rabat and which will soon be submitted to Algiers and to Nouakchott. But so many mediation efforts have already failed ...

6463

CSO: 4400

MUSLIM THEOLOGICAL CONTEMPLATES CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF ISLAM

Interview with AL-RA'IF in Arabic 18, 20 Jan 79

[Interview with his eminence Prof Muhammad Fal Bin 'Abdallah on the problems facing the modern Moslem, by Yahya Bin Fata]

[Al-Ra'if 19, p 3]

[Answer] It is clear like these when the Islamic faith faces plots and intrigues designed by the enemies of God who conceal themselves in many disguises, and when the Moslem stands before a multitude of "novelties" wondering about Islam's position in them, it becomes incumbent upon our legist-theologians, faqih, to rise up and present respectability laid on their shoulder--that of instructing the Moslem on the correct path which he should take in the maze of today's complex world. It is the duty of our faqih today to be aware of all the complexities of life in the modern age. Islamic law has after all proved to be just, wise and suitable for all times and places. As such it is the consummate religion of mankind, and it has the capacity to remove mankind from falsehood and deviation. His eminence Prof Muhammad Fal Bin 'Abdallah is one of a few who have distinguished themselves in and who addressed themselves to the problems of Islam and expressed their views about them. Today we publish the first part of a series we have recently conducted with his eminence in the hope that the interview will mark the beginning of a fruitful and constructive work with our readers.

[Question] Some of the problems facing our society today are those of housing, health, social order and family planning. Where does Islam stand on these

[Answer] The problem of housing is a major dilemma. It is basically a question of justice. As God would, prohibited in many verses of the Quran and in many prophetic traditions and virtues is considered by them to be one of the worst of crimes. Perpetrators of it are promised to perdition. I believe that the Moslem is responsible for the state of defeat in which Moslems find themselves today. In many jurisdictions of usury incur the wrath of God and His Prophet. Injustice, defeat. Moslems in this age should rise themselves of the

predicament of usury, especially since God has bestowed upon them riches which obviate the need for usury. The Islamic states, for example, can set up banks which are free of usury. There have been several experiments towards that end, and I have no doubt that the rich Moslem countries can guarantee the success of any such experiments.

As to slavery, it was there before Islam and it had several causes. Men enslaved other men for the most insignificant reasons, for example taking captives during conquests or wars or indenturing people because of debts and so forth. Islam put an end to all those practices, but kept only one practice, namely, captivity in wars waged for the glory of God. Therefore, we see that slavery in Islam is different from that which existed in Europe and America. Slavery in Islam is an unassailable honor. Islam, however, should not be blamed if some deviant Moslems had mistreated their slaves. What matters here is the principles of Islam. The Prophet, God bless him, has promised the slave who faithfully serves his God and his master that he will be rewarded twice. That is why the venerable Abu Hurayrah al-Dawsi, one of the Companions of the Prophet himself, God bless him, used to grind grain with his servant and help her when she became too tired to go on. So slavery in Islam is an honor and not what others have been noisily saying about it. And yet, the public wanted to do away with it. If this is to be done it should be done in accordance with the principles of Islam, that is without usurpation or arrogation of money and property. Rulers should also interest masters in doing away with slavery and should insure that the masters be fair to their slaves and the slaves be fair to the masters.

As to the canned meats, if they are imported from a Moslim country or a country whose inhabitants believe in a heavenly religion, such as Christianity and Judaism, then they are permissible and legitimate under the law of Islam. If, however, they are imported from an atheistic communist country, they are dead and cannot be used, bought or eaten.

With regard to family planning, it involves the question of coitus interruptus birth control cited in the Prophet's traditions. In some of the traditions, the Prophet forbade coitus interruptus. Later is quoted as saying: we used to practice coitus interruptus during the era of the Prophet, God bless him. In essence, if coitus interruptus was practiced with a slave woman or a willing wife, it was permissible. Otherwise, it was not. Family planning is then related to coitus interruptus as long as it does not reach the point of abortion. Abortion, insofar as it means removal of the sperm from the uterus after it has lodged itself there, is impermissible. But when it is a question of removing the sperm after it has developed into an embryo it becomes a crime equivalent to murder. It is said that coitus interruptus is lesser than wa'd, the burial alive of newborn girls.

As to complete sterilization, I do not consider it permissible unless it is directed by a doctor who has determined that childbirth would be dangerous to this or that woman. Sterilization in that case becomes a question of life or

death. Anything aside from that would be a violation of God's law of creation. If, however, a married couple agreed not to have children for economic or health reasons, they are entitled to do that.

[Question] At a time when subversive currents, such as communism or Masonry, are widely spread, how do you judge a Moslem who belongs to any one of these movements?

[Answer] I believe that affiliation with communism makes a Moslem an atheist and has renounced his religion. By embracing communism or Masonry, a Moslem turns against his religion, because those two movements are deviationist and opposed to the principles of Islam. Communism, for example, and as everyone knows, is a purely atheistic ideology which does not believe in the Creator or in the heavenly prophecies and messages. Islam and communism are two opposites which are utterly irreconcilable. One cannot believe in God and deny him at one and the same time, or believe in the Prophet and deny the other prophecies. This amounts to deception and hypocrisy.

Masonry, despite its deceptive and twisting facade, is in fact a Jewish organization which was founded for the specific purpose of dividing and spying on Muslims, leading them away from their homes and distorting the truths of Islam. Such "tricks of appealing things," as the old saying goes. Accordingly, a Muslim should embrace no religious creed other than our own true faith, the faith of Islam.

[The End of Page 5.]

[Question] [Answer] Currency exchange is a pressing necessity in our modern age. How does Allah view that?

[Answer] I believe that the exchange of different currencies, if it is done openly (and be said) is permissible, such as exchanging two different kinds of currencies (dinars and dirhams). There is no usury in such an exchange. Interest, however, is not permitted except in real estate and when there is a great need for an exchange. In such a situation, currencies can be exchanged indirectly. One who has currencies and not in hand or when it is impossible to exchange them or has some kind of a currency. Exchange can be that rather than being by means of a currency, as what Moslem Riqin would call "barter" [a kind of exchange]. As Riqin defines it, barter means, for example, that "... a man has a coin but is afraid to carry it with him so he goes for exchange of certain coin, and give it to a person in his own name and that person is to write a bill of exchange which he shall then deliver to him in another country, and deliver in another person who shall pay him the coin he needs in the country of that bill." Originally, barter exchange was prohibited because it was not doing the direct exchange of currencies. However, justifying the legitimization of such a practice.

[Question] And what about women--their education and employment?

[Answer] God has made education and learning open to all and not a monopoly for men. This is contrary to what some of the ancients said who disagree with the idea of educating women and who sometimes refer to this as "giving a snake more poison." In such a saying, they liken women to snakes and say that educating women would be akin to enabling snakes to become more vicious and evil. Abd-al-'Ala' al-Ma'arri says, in a poem advocating that women be kept ignorant: [two lines of poetry omitted]. Islam, however, does not share the view of these gullible people, and has promoted education for men and women alike. And as we see that the Companions of the Prophet included women who, with other members of the Faithful, were among the venerable faqirs and mystics during that era. They used to be asked for religious opinions, as men were asked, and their answers were applied. If you read the "Tahqiqat-al-'Ulum" (classification of sciences), you will find that many women during the early period of Islam had surpassed men and were quite prominent and influential in various fields of scholarship and learning.

As to whether women should work or not, they have the same rights as men except where it involves public service. Islamic law prohibits women from public service because such service is related to the rights and interests of the general public (e.g. the presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary representation etc.). Women can, however, occupy any private positions. Al-Buhari records that when the Prophet, God bless him, learned that the Persians proclaimed the daughter of Khosrow [Kisra] as their queen, he commented: "A nation that entrusts its affairs to a woman will not succeed." The word affairs here refers to their polity, not private affairs.

[Question] There is a strange perception which is gaining ground nowadays--that all women wearing revealing clothes. How do you view such a phenomenon?

[Answer] I have already touched upon this matter and cited many of the Prophetic traditions which reveal women who wear such clothes. Muslim (a proper name) and others like the Prophet, God bless him, are saying that there are two groups of people that go against the will of Allah and are destined to fail, and that one of them is the "uncovered women who will not shield the private parts of their bodies." The verse says: [Quran 24:31] "And let women draw their veils over their bodies and heads." In addition, God has ordered husbands, fathers and others who reveal women's bodies to be punished. And it is part of the punishment which was announced by Allah, God bless him, to the Prophet, tell your wives and daughters and the women of the household to cover themselves well in their robes and not to display and show themselves as women did in the Qadisiyya [pre-Islamic era].

As to performing prayers while dressed in clothing not of modesty, this is another matter. It is true that it is better to be dressed in the proper manner of attire and to perform the prayers properly while dressed in that manner. But if one finds it is not possible to dress in that way, then praying

is it is acceptable. But that does not justify the wearing of such a dress. Qalil has said, "One sins if he wears silk, but his prayers are accepted." A person disobeys on the one hand and his prayer is admissible on the other hand.

[Question] What do you think about the principle of applying Islamic law in Moslem countries and prescribing Koranic punishments for the perpetrators of great sins? Were such punishments applied in the time of the Prophet, God bless him?

[Answer] The application of Islamic law is the duty of all Moslem governments. There is no difference between Koranic punishments or other kinds of punishment. Islamic law should be applied in full. To apply parts of the law and disregard other parts is like believing in certain parts of Islam but not in others. The provisions and principles of Islam have to be taken as a totality. They are like a full body--if a limb is taken out of it the body will be deformed. The beauty and perfection of Islam reveal themselves only when they are applied in full. It is as if one is talking about a beautiful painting--if a part of the painting is obliterated or wiped out, the whole painting will be spoiled and it will become an incomplete and mutilated painting which has lost its charm and unity.

As to Koranic punishments, they were actually instituted during the Prophet's era. We, God bless him, cut hands, flogged and stoned sinners. It happened once that a woman from the Banu-Makhzum clan stole something. As everybody considers haram, the Banu-Makhzum clan is one of the oldest and most venerable of the tribe of Quraysh. Despite her noble descent, however, the Makhzum woman stole and her theft was established. The Banu-Makhzum clan, however, was averse at the suggestion that its daughter, noble descent or not, would have to be punished. Quraysh, therefore, asked Usamah Bin-Zayd, a close friend of the Prophet's heart, to intercede with the Prophet, God bless him, on behalf of the Makhzum woman. When the Prophet, God bless him, was asked to spare the woman, he became angry and said, "Are you interceding against God's punishment?" and he cut the woman's hand. Then he added, "If Fatimah, daughter of Muhammad [the Prophet himself] stole, I would cut her hand."

We know that the law of Islam applies to the highborn and the lowly person alike. The cause of the destruction of the [ancient] people of Israel was that if a lowly person stole his hand was cut, whereas if a high-born person stole his hand was spared.

Penalties and penalties prescribed under the law of Islam were applied at the time of the Prophet, God bless him, and the whipped and stoned caliphate came after him. The application of such penalties ceased only in the present era when the world has reached the state of the Umayyads and the Abbasids, whereby we hear people say--that we have reached the state of the Umayyads and the Abbasids, whereby we hear people say--that if we cut a thief's hand each time something is stolen something, we may end up cutting the hands of a great many people, so much so that our nation will become one of severed hands. This is our trial. Cutting a

hand is in effect cutting a crime, so that cutting one hand will save the cutting of millions of hands because people will avoid stealing to spare themselves the penalties prescribed under Islamic law. In other words, there is a certain wisdom in cutting hands which makes this practice a positive one. The institution of Koranic penalties is a deterrent against crime. The cutting of one hand will deter millions of hands from theft, hence protect and safeguard the properties of Moslems.

9254

C30: 4402

MUNICIPAL ELECTION PRECINCTS IN YEMEN LISTED

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 16 May 79 p 5

[Article: "List of Election Precincts for San'a' and the Other Provincial Capitals"]

[Text] List of Election Precincts in the City of Ta'izz

The first precinct includes:

- (a) Hawd al-Ashraf quarter
- (b) al-Shammasi quarter

Precinct headquarters: al-Thawrah Hospital Police Station Building.

The second precinct includes all of al-Jahmaliyah quarter. Precinct headquarters: Maydan al-Shuhada'.

The third precinct includes the following quarters:

- (a) al-Suq al-Markazi quarter
- (b) al-Jadiri quarter

Precinct headquarters: New Traffic Building in al-Hasab.

The fourth precinct includes:

- (a) Hospital quarter
- (b) al-Sayilah quarter

Precinct headquarters: former Military Hospital Clinic.

The fifth precinct includes:

- (a) Bab Musa quarter
- (b) Old City quarter

Precinct headquarters: Bab Musa Police Station.

The sixth precinct includes:

- (a) al-Tahrir quarter
- (b) 26 September Street

Precinct headquarters: License Bureau.

List of Election Precincts for the City of al-Hudaydah

The first precinct includes the following quarters:

- (a) al-Manzar section
- (b) al-Hawkin
- (c) al-Karnish
- (d) Ghalil and al-Sandaqah

Precinct headquarters: al-Karnish Police Station.

The second precinct includes:

- (a) al-Yaman section
- (b) al-Musharri' section
- (c) al-Hunud section
- (d) Dakhil al-Sur section

Precinct headquarters: Bab Mushrif Police Station.

The Third precinct includes:

- (a) al-Sadiqah section
- (b) al-Shuhhariyah section
- (c) al-Dahamiyah section

Precinct headquarters: Municipalities Office, formerly Municipal Council Hall.

The fourth precinct includes:

- (a) al-Sham section
- (b) al-Turk section
- (c) Business quarter
- (d) al-Qal'ah

Precinct headquarters: Province Police Department.

The fifth precinct includes:

- (a) al-Ta'awun section
- (b) al-'Umal quarter
- (c) al-Mughtaribin quarter
- (d) al-Qahirah quarter
- (e) al-Zabariyah section

Precinct headquarters: City of al-Ta'awun Police Station.

The sixth precinct includes:

- (a) al-Hali quarter
- (b) al-'Aysh and al-Milh section
- (c) Zayid ibn Sultan section

Precinct headquarters: al-Da'iri Police Station.

Al-Farz precinct headquarters: the new building of the Province Police Department.

List of Election Precincts for City of Ibb

The first precinct includes the following quarters:

al-Martabah al-Qadimah starting from al-Bab al-Kabir and extending through the Finance Building, including the following sections: al-Kazimi, al-Bihani, al-Jami' al-Kabir, 'Aqil, al-Sunni, al-Shams, al-Nami, al-Hammam, al-Makhlatah, al-Shaykh Musa, al-Midaqqah, al-Jabbanah and Hamd.

Precinct headquarters al-Bab al-Kabir of the city.

The second precinct includes the following quarters:

al-Musinnah, al-Mu'aqqabah, al-Sha'ab and al-Humr, al-Qirbah, Wadi, Zahab, al-Jabbanah, al-'Ulya, al-Kabsi Street, al-Jabbanah al-Sufia, al-Jabbanah al-Wusta, al-Manzar al-A'la, al-Suq al-Markazi, and Jarrafah.

Precinct headquarters: former Traffic Department, in the al-Suq al-Markazi vicinity.

The third precinct includes the following quarters: al-Sharq, al-Wazi'iyah, Ahwal Hawabil, al-Manzar al-Asfal, al-Iblan, Ahwal Ramadan, Ahwal al-Thalath, al-'Addayn Street and al-Ma'had Street ending at Nuqtah al-Mazaff.

Precinct headquarters: new Police Department.

List of the Election Precincts for the City of Hajjah

The first precinct includes the following quarters:

- (a) City of Hajjah quarter and jurisdictions belonging to it.

Precinct headquarters: al-Nur School.

The second precinct includes the following quarters:

- (a) al-Zahrayn quarter and jurisdictions belonging to it.

Precinct headquarters: al-Thawrah School.

List of Election Precincts for the City of Ma'rib

Headquarters: Ma'rib Province Building.

List of Election Precincts for the City of al-Bayda'

Precinct headquarters: al-Bayda' Province Building.

List of Election Precincts for the City of Dhamar

The first precinct includes the following quarters:

- (a) al-Jarajish
- (b) al-Hawtah

Precinct headquarters: Place of Assembly.

The second precinct includes the following quarters:

- (a) al-Mahall
- (b) al-Qah

Precinct headquarters: the Cultural Center in Khamar.

List of Election Precincts in the City of al-Mahwit

Precinct headquarters: al-Mahwit Province Building.

List of Election Precincts in the City of Sa'dah

Precinct headquarters: Salam School, Bab al-Yaman, Sa'dah.

| Precinct | Boundaries | Precinct Head- quarters | Description |
|----------|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1 | From al-Tahrir to the Southern Airport passing through 'Abd-al-Mughanni St to the Southern Airport, western side. From al-Tahrir to 'Asr passing through Jamal St and ending in 'Asr, southern side. | Police College | Includes within its boundaries 'Ali 'Abd-al-Mughanni St, the Police College, Jamal St, al-Kahraba' St, the al-Bahmah al-Lakam section, the Industrial Complex neighborhood, Gharaqah al-Sin, al-Zabiri St to the Police College intersection, Hiddah St, and Southwest al-Safiyah with all its quarters. |
| 2 | From al-Tahrir to the Southern Airport passing through 'Abd-al-Mughanni St to the Southern Airport, eastern side. al-Sa'ilah from Qubbah al-Mahdi to Bayt Mi'yad, Western al-Sa'ilah. | Fire Station in al- Safiyah | Includes within its boundaries al-Daf'i St, Bustan al-Sultan, the al-Sa'di section eastward to al-Sa'ilah, Old al-Safiyah with all its new quarters, ending at Bayt al-'Asimi and Bayt al-'Asimi and Bayt Mi'yad. |
| 3 | From Qubbah al-Mahdi to Maydan al-Luqyah to Southeast Naqm. Hamir police to Bayt Mi'yad, Eastern al-Sa'ilah. | Former Traffic Building | Includes within its borders the Talhah section and jurisdictions belonging to it, Suq al-Baqr, al-Abhar, Bustan Sharib, al-Zabiri St from the intersection with Police College St to Bab al-Yaman, the al-Sa'di section in East al-Sa'ilah, the Suq al-Malh quarters, Maydan al-Luqyah lying south of Qasr al-Silah eastward, Muhammad 'Ali 'Uthman St, and ending with the quarters of Southeast Naqm. |

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